Does Safety Culture Predict Clinical Outcomes? by Wilson, Katherine Ann
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 
2007 
Does Safety Culture Predict Clinical Outcomes? 
Katherine Ann Wilson 
University of Central Florida 
 Part of the Psychology Commons 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Doctoral Dissertation (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more 
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu. 
STARS Citation 
Wilson, Katherine Ann, "Does Safety Culture Predict Clinical Outcomes?" (2007). Electronic Theses and 
Dissertations, 2004-2019. 3413. 
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/3413 
DOES SAFETY CUTLURE PREDICT CLINICAL OUTCOMES? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
KATHERINE ANN WILSON 
M.S. University of Central Florida, 2002 
B.S. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 1998 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Department of Psychology 
in the College of Sciences 
at the University of Central Florida 
Orlando, Florida 
 
 
Fall Term 
2007 
 
 
 
Major Professor: Eduardo Salas 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2007 Katherine A. Wilson
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Patient safety in healthcare has become a national objective. Healthcare 
organizations are striving to improve patient safety and have turned to high reliability 
organizations as those in which to model. One initiative taken on by healthcare is 
improving patient safety culture—shifting from one of a ‘no harm, no foul’ to a culture of 
learning that encourages the reporting of errors, even those in which patient harm does 
not occur. Lacking from the literature, however, is an understanding of how safety culture 
impacts outcomes. While there has been some research done in this area, and safety 
culture is argued to have an impact, the findings are not very diagnostic. In other words, 
safety culture has been studied such that an overall safety culture rating is provided and it 
is shown that a positive safety culture improves outcomes. However, this method does 
little to tell an organization what aspects of safety culture impact outcomes. Therefore, 
this dissertation sought to answer that question but analyzing safety culture from multiple 
dimensions. The results found as a part of this effort support previous work in other 
domains suggesting that hospital management and supervisor support does lead to 
improved perceptions of safety. The link between this support and outcomes, such as 
incidents and incident reporting, is more difficult to determine. The data suggests that 
employees are willing to report errors when they occur, but the low occurrence of such 
reportable events in healthcare precludes them from doing so. When a closer look was 
taken at the type of incidents that were reported, a positive relationship was found 
between support for patient safety and medication incidents. These results initially seem 
counterintuitive. To suggest a positive relationship between safety culture and medication 
incidents on the surface detracts from the research in other domains suggesting the 
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opposite. It could be the case that an increase in incidents leads an organization to 
implement additional patient safety efforts, and therefore employees perceive a more 
positive safety culture. Clearly more research is needed in this area. Suggestions for 
future research and practical implications of this study are provided. 
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SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
 
We live in a world that is filled with complexity and errors, especially within 
health care. Advances in technology, and a growing and aging population further 
complicate an already taxed system. As Gene Kranz (2000) entitled his book, “Failure is 
not an option”, particularly when the lives of millions seeking safe healthcare treatment 
are at risk. Unfortunately, given the complexity and ambiguity of many tasks, long hours 
on-the-job, and difficult vigilance duties, even the most diligent and conscientious 
clinician will make errors (Leape, 1994; Risser, Rice, Salisbury et al., 1999). Reason 
(1990) has defined human error as any “occasion in which a planned sequence of mental 
or physical activities fails to achieve its intended outcome” either as a result of an 
inadequate plan or intended actions not going as planned (p. 9).  
In an effort to protect humans (e.g., patients, staff), laws, regulations and 
governing agencies have been developed (e.g., Joint Commission for the Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations, JCAHO). State and federal regulations abound requiring 
hospitals to have safety initiatives in place and to report errors that cause harm to a 
patient or employee. However, despite these safety laws and regulations for 
organizations, a significant number of incidents continue to occur each year. The widely 
recognized Institute of Medicine report entitled “To Err is Human”, details that each year 
between 44,000 to 98,000 Americans are thought to be harmed as a result of medical 
errors. Furthermore, research suggests that preventable adverse events are a leading cause 
of death in the United States (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 1999). Approximately 15 
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million incidents of patient harm occur in US hospitals each year (Institute for Health 
Improvement, 2006), with top performing hospitals operating with 40% fewer errors than 
the lowest performing hospitals (healthgrades.com, 2007). Furthermore, some have 
estimated that approximately 70% of reported errors were preventable and at least 50% of 
errors that occur in healthcare are not reported (Leape, 1994). In most cases, the 
individual (e.g., doctor, nurse) does not intentionally commit the errors but these efforts 
found that the root of human error stems from many different sources including, but not 
limited to, faulty systems, inadequate training, procedures and/or safety culture (e.g., 
Helmreich & Merritt, 2000; Mearns & Flin, 1998; Wilson, Priest, Salas, & Burke, 2005). 
The healthcare community has a number of taboos and perverse incentives that 
have helped to sustain a strong culture of resistance and secrecy around reporting and 
addressing errors and failure (e.g., ‘no harm, no foul’). Admittedly, there will always be 
the risk of error where human operators are involved (“to err is human”). However, there 
are steps that organizations can take to reduce dangerous, sometimes lethal, incidents that 
stem from a poor safety culture. The dramatic rise in patient safety as a national 
healthcare policy initiative in the United States and a number of other industrialized 
nations has stimulated sustained dialogue about systems redesign, advancement of 
medical education and training, and culture change with the goal of moving towards a 
system such that errors are minimized. But process towards high reliability is slow and 
arduous and much can be learned from other industries such as aviation and nuclear 
power.  
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Despite the inevitability of human error, there are organizations operating in 
complex environments that are able to maintain an exceptionally safe workplace. These 
organizations, such as those within aviation and nuclear power, have been termed high 
reliability organizations (HROs). For example, the commercial aviation industry (Part 
121 Scheduled Air Carriers) experienced only 25 accidents in 2006, two of which 
included fatalities—49 total fatalities to be exact 
(http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/Table6.htm). These figures are exceptionally small 
considering the almost eight billion miles flown that year and millions of passengers 
aboard these flights. Due to their excellent safety records and continued effectiveness, 
high reliability organizations have received an increasing amount of attention within the 
past 15 years and other organizations, such as those in healthcare (e.g., pediatric cardiac 
surgery units; Carthey, de Leval, Wright, Farewell, & Reason, 2003), are striving to 
evolve to high reliability status (Weick & Roberts, 1993). One way that this is 
accomplished is by developing a culture in which safety and learning are a priority. 
However, limited theoretically-based research exists regarding the impact of these efforts. 
A search of the literature indicated 78 articles which empirically look at safety culture. 
However, only six of those focused on the impact of safety culture or climate on 
outcomes (e.g., errors, injury rates), whereas 10 focused on safety culture or climate on 
safe behaviors or participation in safety activities. Furthermore, many of these studies 
examined the impact of safety culture as a whole rather than what aspects of safety 
culture impacted outcomes. For example, Hofmann and Mark (2006) found that overall 
safety climate was significantly related to medication errors but it was not indicated as to 
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which aspects of safety climate most influenced these errors. It is not surprising that there 
is limited research in this area. This type of data is difficult to collect due to factors from 
limited time and resources, difficulty identifying a clear criterion and in general the low 
occurrence of incidents within HROs. In addition, criterion measures are difficult to 
identify and it is hard to control the various extraneous variables that may influence (e.g., 
moderate, mediate) the relationship between safety culture and clinical outcomes. 
 
Purpose of the Current Study 
 
Typical patient safety initiatives have focused on improving micro-levels of the 
organization (e.g., better training and education for staff). While this is one approach, it 
should not be the only approach (i.e., training and education alone may not be enough). 
Taking a lesson from high reliability organizations, healthcare organizations are now 
approaching patient safety from a macro-perspective. One way that this is being done is 
by addressing the organization's safety culture and climate. Much of the healthcare 
research examining safety culture and climate focuses on what impacts it and how to 
improve it. Research examining the impact of safety culture on clinical outcomes is 
virtually non-existent. Thus, the research proposed here seeks to investigate this seldom 
studied relationship. 
Figure 1 provides the overarching framework for this dissertation. Specifically, 
this research will utilize high reliability theory (HRT) as an organizing framework and 
will focus on the relationship between high reliability values at the organizational level as 
they are manifested through employee perceptions (i.e., perceptions of safety culture) and 
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finally its impact on patient safety outcomes. Figure 2 presents a model that depicts the 
hypothesized relationships among variables in the proposed study. According to this 
model, the relationship between perceptions of organizational/supervisory support for 
safety (e.g., feedback and communication about errors) and outcomes are mediated by 
perceptions of staff level variables, such as teamwork and communication openness. The 
testing of this model should provide researchers with a better understanding of the impact 
of actions at all levels of the organization influence patient safety. Methodologically, this 
study will utilize perceptions of safety culture collected from employees within five 
critical care units at seven campuses within one large Central Florida hospital. Patient 
safety outcome data will be obtained from both survey-based data and various units 
responsible for maintaining incident databases within the hospital. Data analysis will 
utilize a multi-level approach further adding to the current research available in the 
literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 High Reliability Theory  
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Figure 1. High reliability theory as a guiding framework 
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Figure 2. Graphical representation of hypothesized relationships  
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SECTION 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
Safety Culture and Climate 
 
It is clearly being recognized that facilitating a safety culture in which we learn 
from errors is critical to a safe environment for patients and employees. For example, the 
Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, signed by President Bush in 2005, 
establishes federal protections “against discovery and unauthorized disclosure of data 
arising from patient safety and quality improvement programs. It also provides for 
certification of patient safety organizations to which healthcare organizations can report 
this data” (http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/532889?rss). Outside of the U.S., 
similar efforts ensue and building a safety culture is the first step of the U.K. National 
Patient Safety Association’s 7 Steps to Patient Safety (NPSA, 2004). 
One way that an organization’s commitment to safety is manifested is through its 
values, and these values translate to the organization’s safety culture. The safety culture 
is then observable through the actions and attitudes of management and employees. In 
this section, a brief discussion of safety culture is provided. Also relevant to this 
discussion is the distinction between safety culture and safety climate. While some argue 
that safety culture is most influential in terms of employee actions and attitudes, others 
argue that it is the safety climate. Further complicating the issue is the fact that others 
have argued that there is no difference between the two concepts, and the terms are often 
used interchangeably (e.g., Denison, 1996). Despite the efforts by researchers to define 
safety culture, making the distinction between safety culture and safety climate has 
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clearly encountered definitional issues (see Tables 1-3). Pidgeon (2001) states “there is 
currently not enough consistent (or published) data to be able to test the reliability of 
existing definitions or measures” of safety culture and climate (p. 54). However, more 
recent publications (e.g., Zhang et al., 2002) have attempted to solve such definitional 
issues evident in the safety literature. Furthermore, a number of surveys measuring an 
organization’s safety culture and climate have been developed and validated in the 
literature (see Singla, Kitch, Weissman, & Campbell, 2006) (more later). While past 
efforts to define these constructs were classified as “unsystematic” and “fragmented” 
(Zhang et al., 2002, p. 4), a comparison of safety culture and climate by way of the 
available literature did yield some clear delineation between the two.  
 
Table 1 
Characteristics of Safety Culture and Climate 
Safety Culture Safety Climate 
• Refers to shared values among organization 
members, defined at the group level. 
• Refers to perceptions, a 
psychological phenomenon, of 
safety at a particular time. 
• Concerned with formal safety issues. • Concerned with intangible issues 
(e.g., situational factors) 
• Relatively enduring, resistant to change, and 
stable. 
• Unstable ands subject to change. 
• Emphasizes contribution from people at 
every level of the organization. 
• Temporal phenomena, described as 
a “snapshot” of safety culture. 
• Impacts member behavior.  
• Reflected in the convergence between reward 
systems and safety structure. 
 
• Reflected in an organization’s willingness to 
learn from errors, accidents, and incidents. 
 
Note: Table adapted from Zhang et al., 2002. 
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Table 2 
Definitions of safety culture from the literature 
Definition of safety culture Domain Reference 
“The objective measurement of attitudes and 
perceptions toward occupational health and safety 
issues.” 
General Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams 
(1995, p. 247)                        
“The collection of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles and 
practices one uses while going about daily activities, 
including management decision in a broader context.” 
General Toft & Reynolds (1994), as 
cited in Kumar & Simpson 
(2005, p. 330) 
“‘Culture’ is a more complex and enduring trait 
reflecting fundamental norms, values, and 
assumptions that to some extent reside in societal 
culture.”  
Healthcare Goodman (2003, p. 25) 
“A set of norms, beliefs, attitudes and practices, 
regarding universal precautions, shared between 
people in a certain place at a certain time.” 
Healthcare Lymer, Richt, & Isaksson 
(2004, p. 548) 
“Where staff within an organisation have a constant 
and active awareness of the potential for things to go 
wrong. Both the staff and the organisation are able to 
acknowledge mistakes, learn from them, and take 
action to put things right.” 
Healthcare National Patient Safety 
Agency (2004, p. 2) 
“One in which safety is everyone’s concern and there 
is an acknowledgement that errors can and will 
occur.” 
Healthcare Dennis (2005, p. 51) 
“The assembly of characteristics and attitudes in 
organizations and individuals which establishes that, 
as an overriding priority,…safety issues receive the 
attention warranted by their significance. Safety 
culture is attitudinal as well as structural, relates both 
to organizations and individuals, and concerns the 
requirements to match all safety issues with 
appropriate perceptions and action.” 
Nuclear International Nuclear 
Safety Advisory Group 
(1991), as cited in 
Sorensen (2002) 
“The product of individual and group values, attitudes, 
perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior 
that determine the commitment to, and the style and 
proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety 
management.” 
Nuclear 
(adopted by 
healthcare)
Health and Safety 
Commission (1993, p. 23); 
adopted by Glendon & 
Stanton (2000); Galvan et 
al. (2005); Lee & Harrison 
(2000); McCarthy & 
Blumenthal (2006); Harvey 
et al. (2001); Cox et al. 
(2006) 
“All forms of learned behaviors which ‘add up to a 
shared commitment to think safely, to behave safely 
and toe believe and trust in the safety measures put in 
place by the organization.’” 
Nuclear Lee (1993), as cited in 
Harvey, Erdos, Bolam, 
Cox, Kennedy & Gregory 
(2002, p. 19) 
“The safety culture of an organization is the product of 
individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, 
Nuclear Health and Safety 
Commission (of Great 
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Definition of safety culture Domain Reference 
competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine 
the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, 
an organization’s health and safety management.” 
Britain (1993) 
“A subset of organizational culture, where the beliefs 
and values refer specifically to matters of health and 
safety.” 
Railway Clarke (1999, p. 185) 
“The shared and learned meanings, experiences and 
interpretations of work and safety—expressed 
partially symbolically—which guide peoples’ actions 
towards risks, accidents and prevention.” 
Manufact-
uring 
Richter & Koch (2004, p. 
705) 
“A temporal manifestation of culture, which is 
reflected in the shared perceptions of the organization 
at a discrete point in time.” 
Offshore 
Oil 
Cox & Cheyne (2000, p. 
114) 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Definitions of safety climate from the literature 
Definition of safety climate Domain Reference 
“The term ‘climate’ best describes employee 
perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes.”  
Healthcare Goodman (2003, 
p. 25) 
“A subset of organizational climate, defined 
primarily in terms of employees’ perceptions. 
Safety climate is the safety culture, such as it 
appears to and is assessed by specific 
healthcare workers.” 
Healthcare Coyle et al. 
(1995), as cited in 
Lymer et al. (2004, 
p. 548) 
“Molar perceptions people have of their work 
settings.” 
Construction Dedobbeleer & 
Beland (1991, p. 
97) 
“A summary of molar perceptions that 
employees share about their work 
environments.” 
Industrial 
organizations 
Zohar (1980, p. 
96) 
“A set of perceptions or beliefs held by an 
individual and/or group about a particular 
entity.” 
Manufacturing/ 
Produce 
Brown & Holmes 
(1986, p. 455) 
“Perceptions of management's commitment 
to safety, employee ownership of safety 
related issues, stereotyping of safety 
conscious employees, adherence to safety 
rules and procedures, and the existence of 
proactive approaches to managing safety.” 
Manufacturing Garavan, & 
O’Brien (2001, p. 
146) 
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Based primarily on the research revolving around organizational culture, the term 
safety culture did not become ‘popularized’ until the late 1980s following the Chernobyl 
disaster (e.g., Mearns & Flin, 1999; Glendon & Stanton, 2000). It was cited, for the first 
time, that a poor safety culture contributed to this major catastrophe (Zhang, Wiegmann, 
von Thaden, Sharma, & Mitchell, 2002). The atomic and nuclear power plant industries 
began the push to define safety culture and were quickly joined by other industries 
experiencing their own disasters (e.g., King’s Cross fire, Piper Alpha oil platform 
explosion, Challenger and Columbia space shuttle disasters; see Pidgeon, 1998; Pidgeon 
& O’Leary, 2000; Reason, 1990; Zhang et al., 2002). The Institution of Occupational 
Safety and Health (1994, as cited in Glendon & Stanton, 2000) reviewed the many 
definitions of safety culture and narrowed them down to three. Their findings suggest that 
the meaning of a safety culture includes or refers to: (1) aspects of organizational culture 
that related to safety (e.g., norms, policies), (2) common values, beliefs, attitudes, and 
behaviors regarding safety, and (3) the joint values, attitudes, competencies, and 
behaviors of individuals and groups that establishes an organization’s commitment to, 
and style and proficiency of its safety program. Similarly, Pidgeon (1991) argues that 
safety culture may be a useful tool in risk management and can be defined under one of 
three headings: (1) norms and rules for dealing with risk, (2) attitudes towards safety, and 
(3) the capacity to reflect on safety practices. In addition, safety culture can be 
approached from two perspectives as: (1) something an organization has (i.e., structures, 
practices, controls, and policies designed to promote safety), or (2) something an 
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organization is (i.e., beliefs, values, and attitudes of organizational members regarding 
safety; Reason, 1998). Finally, safety culture is recognized as a higher-level construct, 
which ultimately influences safety climate. It can be seen from these definitions and from 
many others (see Table 2) that safety culture is seen as relating to an individual, group, or 
organization’s practices and attitudes.  
Safety climate, in comparison to safety culture, is defined more as perceptions 
regarding safety rather than practices or attitudes (Guldenmund, 2000) and is a part of 
organizational climate (Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams, 1995). Schneider (1990, as cited in 
Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998) defines safety climate as an individual's perceptions regarding 
events, practices, procedures, and behaviors that are rewarded, supported, and expected 
for safety in an organization. Similarly, others define safety climate as the summary of 
beliefs and perceptions of workers about safety in organizations (Williamson, Feyer, 
Cairns, & Biancotti, 1997; see also Table 3). Unlike safety culture which was derived 
from the literature regarding organizational culture, safety climate is rooted more in 
empirical research (Glendon & Stanton, 2000; also see Brown & Holmes, 1986; Flin, 
Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Williamson et al., 1997; Zohar, 1980) and is most 
often assessed by questionnaires attempting to get at certain safety dimensions. 
 
How is a Patient Safety Culture Measured? 
 
Typically, safety culture is measured using self-report surveys, gathering data on 
individual perceptions regarding overall perceptions of safety culture or organizational 
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and management support for safety. However, this provides a limited picture of what 
factors truly impact safety culture. In other words, safety culture manifests itself in more 
ways than just organizational level and management support, namely staff level factors 
such as teamwork (see Figure 2). Within healthcare, there are a number of measures 
available in the literature that examine the patient safety culture of an organization. It has 
been argued in naval and commercial aviation that the administration of safety culture 
surveys is a useful component of efforts to improve safety culture (e.g., Sexton, Thomas, 
& Helmreich, 2000; Gaba, Singer, Sinaiko et al., 2003), and other communities, such as 
healthcare, are following suit. The most comprehensive review of healthcare efforts to 
date was conducted by Singla and colleagues (2006), who reviewed 13 different 
instruments used within the community. The general purpose of these measures is to 
assess attributes of the organization which are malleable, so that interventions can be 
introduced within those areas in which a problem is identified. Singla et al. (2006) 
reviewed each of the measures to identify the dimensions assessed, as well as to evaluate 
the measures for validity and usability. Of these 13 measures, two were selected as being 
a cut above the rest—the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Hospital 
Survey on Patient Safety (HSOPS) and the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ). These 
instruments were selected for their psychometric properties, indicating that these 
measures are reliable and valid, as well as for inclusion of dimensions beyond the 
organization and management support level, specifically, dimensions related to teamwork 
or communication. In addition, both the HSOPS and SAQ surveys provide users with the 
ability to benchmark safety culture within one’s unit or hospital with others. Table 4 
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compares the dimensions tapped by the HSOPS and SAQ. As will be discussed further in 
the methods section, this dissertation focuses on the use of the HSOPS due to the fact that 
the inclusion of more dimensions would be more diagnostic of the hospital’s patient 
safety culture. For example, instead of generating an overall score for perceptions of 
management as measured by the SAQ, the HSOPS breaks this dimension down further to 
focus on supervisor expectations and actions promoting safety, organizational learning, 
and feedback and communication about errors, to name a few. The dimensions measured 
by the HSOPS will be integrated into the discussion provide next, as hypothesized 
relationships are proposed. 
 
Table 4 
Comparison of dimensions measured by HSOPS and SAQ 
HSOPS SAQ 
Patient Safety Grade Safety climate 
Overall Perceptions of Safety Safety climate 
Frequency of Event Reporting (i.e., willingness 
to report errors) 
Safety Climate 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions 
promoting safety 
Perceptions of management 
Organizational Learning—Continuous 
improvement 
Perceptions of management 
Communication Openness Perceptions of management/ 
Teamwork climate 
Feedback and Communication about Error Perceptions of management 
Non-punitive Response To Error Perceptions of management 
Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety Perceptions of management 
Teamwork Within Hospital Units Teamwork climate 
Teamwork Across Hospital Units Teamwork climate 
Hospital Handoffs & Transitions Teamwork climate 
Staffing Working conditions 
Number of Events Reported N/A 
N/A Job satisfaction 
N/A Stress recognition 
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High Reliability Theory (HRT) 
 
The guiding framework for this dissertation focuses on that of high reliability 
theory (HRT). HRT posits that organizations are capable of functioning within hazardous 
environments because of their complexity (e.g., components have multiple functions) and 
tight coupling (e.g., time dependent operations, specialized personnel) (Rijpma, 1997; 
Roberts, 1999; Perrow, 1984). Furthermore, HRT suggests that accidents occur because 
human operators of complex systems are not complex enough themselves to sense and 
anticipate problems that may be generated by the system (Ruchlin, Dublin, & Callahan, 
2004), and therefore, organizations prevent accidents through organizational design and 
management (Pizzi, Goldfarb, & Nash, 2001). However, high reliability organizations 
also recognize the importance of other levels within the organization that impact safety, 
namely technical and social (i.e., teams) redundancies to enhance reliabilities (LaPorte & 
Consolini, 1991; Tamuz & Harrison, 2006; Wilson et al., 2005). 
To successfully manage the factors at multiple levels, HRT suggests that an 
organization’s “mindfulness” or their ability to exhibit “a pattern of heedful interrelations 
of actions” (Weick & Roberts, 1993, p. 357) has allowed them to reach their high 
reliability status. Furthermore, mindfulness at the organizational level is comprised of a 
commitment to certain values and actions—specifically, commitment to resilience, 
sensitivity to operations, deference to expertise, reluctance to simplify, and preoccupation 
with failure (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Finally, in addition to holding the values 
previously mentioned, high reliability organizations enhance their commitment to 
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excellence by (a) anticipating dangers that may arise, while coping with dangers that 
occur (Wildavsky, 1988), (b) actively seeking knowledge about what they don’t know, 
(c) designing reward systems that recognize both the cost of failures and the benefits of 
reliability, and (d) communicating the whole picture to all levels of the organization 
(Roberts & Bea, 2001). Thus, the successful combination of these values and 
characteristics, which are argued here to manifest through a culture of safety, allows high 
reliability organizations to reduce and mitigate errors. 
One of the most widely discussed instances of HROs, and one that healthcare and 
other organizations can learn from, is the US Naval aircraft carrier fleet (Rochlin, La 
Porte, & Roberts, 1987). Each carrier, acting like its own ‘organization’, successfully 
conducts flight operations at sea while pushing the “edge of the envelope” (Rochlin et al., 
1987, p. 76) in conditions that are extreme, complex, and unpredictable. Furthermore, 
while operations manuals are available to dictate specific procedures and tasks at the 
micro level, lacking is a discussion of how to integrate this into the greater whole. As if 
this weren’t enough, approximately every 40 months, there is almost 100% turnover of 
all officers and crew, as each member gets reassigned to a different duty. The ability of 
the US Navy to maintain successful operations despite these challenges ensures its status 
of high reliability. So, how do they do it? First, the system operates with a set of 
redundancies—technical (e.g., computers, radar), supply (e.g., extra aircraft parts), 
decision/management (e.g., cross checking and fail-safe redundancy). In addition, the US 
Navy addresses the high turnover rate on carriers by training officers with general rather 
than specific skills that are transportable from job to job, as well as struggling to maintain 
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morale and unit cohesion. Finally, the fleet remains adaptable within its day-to-day 
operations (e.g., flight operations, planning) by ‘disregarding’ rank with the interest of 
safety. This does not mean that the steep hierarchy of rank is unimportant. Rather, the 
organization recognizes that each member brings his/her unique perspective and expertise 
to the table and that in some instances, following a chain of command is not practical if a 
mishap is to be averted. For example, the lowest ranking individual can suspend flight 
operations immediately in the interest of safety without clearance from supervisors. 
But critical to the success of HROs is not just organizational support for safety, 
but also more micro-levels of the organization. Specifically, individuals and teams 
embedded within the organization are a critical factor playing into the success of a high 
reliability organization. Wilson et al. (2005) extracted from the high reliability 
organization and team literatures, arguing that to become a high reliability team, team 
members must exhibit behaviors that facilitate those characteristics and values held by 
the organization within which they operate, for example, communication, mutual 
performance monitoring, back up behavior, and assertiveness. While the teamwork 
behaviors described are those that may be exhibited by non-high reliability teams, high 
reliability teams differ in that they are able to consistently and effectively demonstrate 
these behaviors over time in complex, dynamic environments while working under high 
levels of stress.  
Given the success of high reliability in organizations (e.g., naval and commercial 
aviation, nuclear), the healthcare community has begun to take strides to achieve this 
status. In line with the discussion of US Naval aircraft carriers, healthcare utilizes 
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redundant systems at the micro-level, such as technology (e.g., automated medication 
dispensing units) and teamwork (e.g., team members monitor performance and call a 
“time out” should they feel patient safety is in jeopardy). In addition, a number of macro-
level patient safety initiatives have been taken, including executive walk rounds (e.g., 
Thomas, Sexton, Neilands, Frankel & Helmreich, 2005), Comprehensive Unit-based 
Safety Program (CUSP), and crisis resource management training (e.g., Howard, Gaba, et 
al., 1992). Each of these serves the purpose of demonstrating management support for 
safety, and thus promoting a safety culture within organizations. At the micro-level, 
teams in the health care community that may be considered high reliability teams include 
(but are not limited to) surgical teams and emergency room teams, or any set of two or 
more team members who consistently and effectively work interdependently towards a 
shared goal in a complex environment (i.e., high risk environments). In the next section, a 
discussion of how the macro and micro levels of the organization relate to safety culture 
in organizations. 
 
HRT and Safety Culture 
 
As previously mentioned, there is a set of core values which sets HROs apart 
from other organizations—sensitivity to operations, reluctance to simplify interactions, 
preoccupation with failure, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise (Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2001). The first three values aid in anticipating and becoming aware of the 
unexpected, as these organizations recognize that “human fallibility is like gravity, 
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weather, and terrain, just another foreseeable hazard” (Reason, 1997, p. 25). In addition, 
they enlist two further values—commitment to resilience and deference to expertise—to 
contain and mitigate the unexpected. Taken together these values combine to “induce a 
state of collective mindfulness that creates a rich awareness of discriminatory detail and 
facilitates the discovery and correction of errors” (Weick et al., 1999, p. 81). While these 
values are not directly observable, they manifest themselves throughout the organization 
(i.e., safety culture) and are thus translated to management and staff attitudes and actions. 
In this section, a discussion is provided regarding the research conducted on 
safety culture and climate, using the values posited by HRT as a framework. It is 
recognized that these values do not operate independently within organizations, however, 
the discussion attempts to categorize pockets of the literature under just one category for 
succinctness. Furthermore, while this dissertation is focusing on the healthcare industry, a 
thorough discussion of safety culture in the community is lacking. Therefore, the search 
was broadened to both HRO and non-HRO communities beyond healthcare to provide a 
complete picture of the research that has been conducted (see Table A.1 in APPENDIX 
A: SUMMARY OF SAFETY CULTURE LITERATURE). 
 
Sensitivity to Operations 
 
Sensitivity to operations is evident within HROs by their concern with the 
unexpected, attention to the operational environment and those on the front line, and the 
acknowledgement that the cause of an accident is often complex (i.e., not the result of a 
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single, active error) (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Building from Reason’s (1990) Swiss 
Cheese Model regarding accidents, these organizations acknowledge that many errors 
remain latent, embedded within the operational system until just the right combination of 
errors occur which lead to an adverse event (Roberts & Bea, 2001; Maurino, Johnston, 
Reason, & Lee, 1995). Sensitivity to operations is promoted in HROs through supervisor 
and management support of day to day activities. Its purpose is to set the tone in the 
organization and its work units by continuously monitoring and discussing events as they 
occur so as to promote patient safety. Success depends on maintaining a clear picture of 
what is going on (i.e., situation awareness) and filtering this information to all levels of 
the organization. 
Supervisors and organization management can promote a sensitivity to operations 
by supporting error detection, providing feedback to employees regarding errors, and 
communicating about how these errors can be prevented in the future. Research has 
indicated that management commitment to safety in manufacturing-type industries is an 
indicator of a positive safety culture (e.g., Rundmo, 1994; Zohar, 1980; 2000), and its 
approach to safety has been linked to a reduction in incidents in three studies. For 
example, Katz-Navon, Naveh, & Stern (2005) found that management support for safety 
(i.e., safety placed as a priority) moderated the relationship between safety procedures 
and number of treatment errors in healthcare. Similarly, O’Toole (2002) found that upper 
management's approach to safety was a significant factor in the reduction of mining and 
construction injury rates. Finally, Zohar (2000) found that supervisor actions and 
expectation were significant predictors of minor injuries in a metal processing plant. 
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These studies suggest that how management approaches and promotes safety has a 
significant effect on incidents. 
Other research suggests that a positive safety culture is associated with a 
commitment from upper level management that supports and encourages safety policies 
and procedures. For example, Zohar (1980) found that management commitment to 
safety was a major factor influencing success of safety programs in a number of industrial 
factories. In 2000, Zohar also found that perceptions of positive supervisor expectations 
towards safety resulted fewer lost-days due to accidents. Zacharatos, Barling and Iverson 
(2005) investigated the relationship between management practices and occupational 
safety. They found that the two were related and the relationship was mediated by safety 
climate and trust in management. Likewise, Cox and Flin (1998) found in 13 
manufacturing companies that management actions for safety was the strongest predictor 
employee actions. Margolis (1973, as cited in Coyle et al., 1995) found similar results. 
Forgaty and Shaw (2003) found that management attitudes and group norms were 
significant predictors of violation behavior in aircraft maintenance workers. Finally, 
additional research suggests that a lack of management commitment leads to lack of trust, 
poor communication, and a lack in confidence in management (Cooper & Phillips, 1994 
as cited in Clark, 1999; Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991). These studies indicate the 
importance of supervisor support in a safety culture in a number of industries, and 
possibly in reducing incidents (e.g., errors). 
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Hypothesis 1. Supervisor expectations about patient safety are significantly 
related to incidents, specifically positive perceptions of supervisor expectations will 
result in fewer incidents. 
Hypothesis 2. Supervisor expectations about patient safety are significantly 
related to overall perceptions of safety, specifically positive perceptions of supervisor 
expectations will result in higher levels of overall perceptions of safety. 
Hypothesis 3. Supervisor expectations about patient safety are significantly 
related to patient safety grade within units, specifically positive perceptions of supervisor 
expectations will result in a higher patient safety grade. 
Hypothesis 4a. Hospital management support is significantly related to number of 
events reported, specifically when hospital management supports patient safety a greater 
number of events will be reported. 
Hypothesis 4b. Willingness to report events partially mediates the relationship 
between hospital management support for safety and number of events reported. 
Hypothesis 5a. Hospital management support is significantly related to unit 
reporting rates, specifically when hospital management supports patient safety there will 
be a higher ratio of events reported to patient days within units. 
Hypothesis 5b. Willingness to report events partially mediates the relationship 
between hospital management support for safety and unit reporting rates. 
Hypothesis 6. Hospital management support for safety is positively related to 
overall perceptions of safety. 
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Hypothesis 7. Hospital management support for safety is positively related to 
patient safety grade. 
Related to setting appropriate expectations regarding safety, management must 
also provide feedback to employees on their safety performance. Without support from 
those said to be enforcing safety, employees will have little motivation to adhere to the 
safety policies and procedures. Research suggests that reinforcing positive safety 
behaviors through feedback and praise may lead to improved safe practices (e.g., 
Hopkins et al., 1986; Komaki, Barwick, and Scott, 1978; Sulzer-Azaroff, Loafman, 
Merante, & Hlavacek, 1990; Komanki, Collins, & Penn, 1982). For example, research 
conducted by Komanki and colleagues (1980; 1982) indicates that consequent feedback 
rather than antecedent feedback results in performance improvements. In addition, it was 
found that feedback provided directly to employees versus their supervisors was more 
effective in reducing injuries and illness (Saari & Näsänen, 1989). Similarly, Laitinen and 
Ruohomaki (1996) found that providing weekly feedback regarding safety to workers at 
Finnish building construction sites led to higher safety levels in the workplace. Finally, 
Cooper (2006) found that management support and feedback were significantly related to 
behavioral safety performance. These studies indicate that the more that employees feel 
that management is committed to safety and their use of safe practices, as demonstrated 
by providing feedback for example, the more likely that employees’ attitudes will 
become more positive and performance will improve. However, like that of supervisor 
expectations, the relationship between feedback and communication about errors to 
safety and behaviors has not been made in healthcare. However, it is expected that when 
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greater feedback is provided, employees will be more likely to follow safe care practices, 
including reporting errors when they occur.  
Hypothesis 8a. Feedback and communication about errors is positively related to 
overall perceptions of safety. 
Hypothesis 8b. Organizational learning partially mediates the relationship 
between feedback and communication about errors and overall perceptions of patient 
safety. 
Hypothesis 9a. Feedback and communication about errors is positively related to 
patient safety grade within units. 
Hypothesis 9b. Organizational learning partially mediates the relationship 
between feedback and communication about errors and patient safety grade. 
Hypothesis 10. Feedback and communication about errors will be positively 
correlated with supervisor expectations about patient safety. 
 
Reluctance to Simplify 
 
There is a desire in organizations to want to simplify a situation in order to 
increase predictability and reduce complexity. HROs recognize that when simplified too 
much this tact can be harmful to the organization and information may be lost. Often 
when things are simplified the human in the loop tends to assume that there are limited 
ways to achieve a certain goal or end state. These inflexible expectations can lead to 
disconfirming or novel evidence being ignored or misinterpreted for once the cognitive 
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structures containing expectations are created, they are very resistant to change. HROs 
exhibit a reluctance to simplify by supporting and promoting (through management 
attitudes and actions) those working at the front line (i.e., the sharp end), specifically by 
promoting and encouraging interaction between people who have diverse expectations 
and backgrounds (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). This interaction also helps the organization 
to expect the unexpected and remain adaptive by providing different viewpoints on the 
same problem or environmental cue. These interactions may include coordinating with 
providers within the same department or unit (e.g., physicians with nurses) or 
coordinating across units (e.g., nurses with pharmacists). HROs recognize the importance 
of effective communication and coordination strategies. Communication and 
coordination in HROs may include coordinating within the same department (e.g., 
between nuclear power plant operators) or across departments (e.g., coordination in air 
traffic control between ground controllers and local air controllers). Similarly in 
healthcare, communication and coordination (i.e., teamwork) must occur not only within 
units but also across units, where different policies and procedures may be in place 
adding additional challenges. For example, within hospital units, patients are handed off 
from one shift to the next. It is important that team members of shift A fully 
communicate all critical information regarding a patient to team members of the 
oncoming shift B. Teamwork is also needed across units; for example, as patients are 
transferred from one unit to the next or when a procedure or medication is requested from 
another department (e.g., laboratory or pharmacy, respectively). Therefore, the 
importance of effectively communicating and coordinating is of the utmost importance. 
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Teamwork in healthcare 
 
HROs encourage teamwork on the front line as the first line of defense in 
detecting errors (Baker, Day & Salas, 2006), and JCAHO is following suit (JCAHO, 
2002). The importance of teams in healthcare is being recognized as physicians, nurses, 
technicians, pharmacists and other healthcare providers must communicate, coordinate 
and cooperate in an effort to ensure quality patient care (Salas, Wilson, Murphy, King & 
Salisbury, in press). Each member brings his/her own expertise to the table and a proper 
‘check and balance system’ encourages team members to question the actions and 
decisions of each other (i.e., the “collaborative care model”; JCAHO, 2002). The purpose 
of this model is to encourage decision making, problems solving, goal setting and sharing 
of patient care responsibilities through teamwork behaviors such as briefing (e.g., 
surgical team briefs a procedure prior to surgery), performance monitoring and back up 
behavior (e.g., a nurse recognizes that a patient is allergic to the medication a physician 
has prescribed), assertiveness (e.g., a nurse calls a ‘time out’ due to a concern for patient 
safety), and leadership (e.g., the resident on call sets the tone for the night shift in the 
emergency department) (Wilson et al., 2005). However, failures in teamwork continue to 
occur, primarily communication, and are a leading cause of patient harm (JCAHO, n.d.). 
In a study by Lingard and colleagues (2004), 36.4% of communication failures in the 
operating room resulted in an observable effect on patient care (e.g., inefficiency, team 
tension, resource waste, care delay). In another study, Thomas, Sexton, Lasky, 
Helmreich, Crandell and Tyson (2006) found correlations between teamwork behaviors 
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and perceptions of overall quality in neonatal care (e.g., resuscitation, labor and delivery). 
Specifically, communication (i.e., information sharing and inquiry) and leadership (i.e., 
assertion, intentions shared, evaluation of plans and leadership) were significantly 
correlated with nurses’ rating of overall quality of care. In addition, communication and 
management (i.e., workload management and vigilance) were significantly correlated 
with compliance with the Neonatal Resuscitation Program’s (NPR) steps for 
administering care. 
Also within the realm of teamwork is communication and coordination during 
handoffs, an area which has been studied in a number of HRO communities. For 
example, Patterson, Roth, Woods, Chow and Gomes (2004) observed 21 handoff 
strategies in four high consequence domains—space shuttle mission control, nuclear 
power, railroad dispatch and ambulance dispatch. A majority of strategies observed 
across disciplines included improving handoff efficiency and effectiveness, increasing 
access to data, improving coordination with others and enabling error detection and 
recovery. Like HROs, healthcare organizations consist of a number of tightly coupled 
work units (e.g., emergency room, intensive care units, surgical department), however, 
healthcare organizations are more loosely coupled when referring to interactions across 
units (Pinelle & Gutwin, 2006). This loose coupling makes it difficult to share 
information across units and increases the likelihood of errors. For example, Flin and 
colleagues (2003) found that more than 50% of operating room personnel who 
participated in their study indicated that they feel uncomfortable telling team members 
from other disciplines that they need to take some sort of action. Other breakdowns occur 
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during handoffs between shifts within the same unit or when transitioning a patient to 
another unit. A notable example of this type of breakdown occurred when a physician 
failed to follow up on test results of a patient which led eventually to a misdiagnosis and 
death of the patient (Gandhi, 2005). Cited was a failure of providers to clearly establish 
primary responsibility for following up on such tests (i.e., diffused responsibility). In 
another case, a patient, Willie King, had the incorrect leg amputated after the surgery 
pool nurse failed to alert the surgery shift nurse during the handoff that the incorrect leg 
was inputted by the clerk for amputation (Cook, Woods, & Miller, 1998, as cited in 
Patterson et al., 2004). Gandhi et al. (2006) found that handoffs contributed to 
approximately 20% of errors in ambulatory settings.  
New communication techniques are being promoted by hospital management. For 
example, the SBAR technique was introduced in 2004 and is being implemented in 
hospitals nationwide as a means to improving communication during handoffs and 
transitions (Leonard, Graham, & Bonacum, 2004; Carroll, 2006). SBAR stands for 
Situation (i.e., “what is going on with the patient?”), Background (i.e., “what is the 
clinical background, or context?”), Assessment (i.e., “what do I think the problem is?”) 
and Recommendation (i.e., “what would I do to correct it?”) (Leonard et al., 2004, p. 
i86). The goal of these techniques is to improve teamwork so as to reduce the risk of 
incidents. 
The research described in the preceding sections supports the notion that 
supervisor and management support for patient safety and frontline staff teamwork both 
impact performance. However, it is unlikely that supervisor support and teamwork 
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operate independently. One influences the other and research shows that this influence 
starts at the top and trickles down to lower levels. However, the relationship between 
supervisor and management support, teamwork and outcomes has yet to be studied. It is, 
thus, argued here that teamwork will mediate the relationship between supervisor and 
management support for patient safety and patient safety outcomes.  
Hypothesis 11. Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between supervisor 
expectations and incidents. 
Hypothesis 12. Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between supervisor 
expectations and overall perceptions of safety. 
Hypothesis 13. Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between supervisor 
expectations and patient safety grade. 
Hypothesis 14. Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between hospital 
management support and incidents. 
Hypothesis 15. Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between hospital 
management support and overall perceptions of safety. 
Hypothesis 16. Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between hospital 
management support and patient safety grade. 
 
Preoccupation with Failure  
 
As HROs are characterized by the minimization of error, they have fewer learning 
opportunities than most organizations. However, HROs remain preoccupied with their 
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failures, no matter how big or small, and even minor mishaps serve as learning 
opportunities (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Rather than dismissing an error that did not 
result in failure as a stroke of bad luck, they view these events as a signal that something 
may be wrong in the system. HROs preoccupation with failure can be seen in the 
frequency of incident reviews, the reporting of errors no matter how inconsequential, and 
an obsession with the liabilities of success (e.g., complacency, temptation to reduce 
safety margins). HROs combat potential liabilities of success through the recognition that 
human error is inevitable and do not let their guard down. Preoccupation with failure can 
be promoted by encouraging staff to report errors when they occur, and shifting from a 
culture of blame to a culture of learning so that errors can be prevented in the future. 
 
Culture of learning and error reporting  
 
Within the healthcare community, there is a tendency “to turn medical mistakes 
resulting in death into tragedies calling for criminal investigation” (Holbrook, 2003, p. 
1119). Furthermore, “punishment drives reporting of errors underground, preventing the 
very systems examination that is needed to discover and correct the underlying causes” 
(Leape, 2000, p. 2). This fear of punishment, without a doubt, encourages providers to 
cover up their mistakes. When evidence exists that negligence was involved, the 
punishment must fit the crime. What about those instances when faulty systems lead to a 
tragic event? When a series of inconsequential mistakes (in isolation) line up just 
perfectly to create a fatal outcome—what then? Should these mistakes be punished? Who 
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do we blame? After all, we know that human error is inevitable. But, humans are at the 
sharp end and in general are the last line of defense in preventing (or contributing to) a 
tragedy. Therefore, they are often easiest to blame and usually are. 
But not all errors lead to a tragic ending, contributing to the mentality of ‘no 
harm, no foul’. These errors are covered up to avoid persecution. Unfortunately, it is 
likely these same errors that on another day may lead to a more severe outcome. 
However, if we do not know what is broken, how can we fix it? How can we prevent 
these errors from occurring? In many HROs, the likelihood of a reportable error is few 
and far between. Therefore, HROs encourage the reporting of errors in which no harm 
has been committed. This is accomplished through a culture of learning, one in which 
employees are encouraged to learn from their mistakes, not hide them and cover them up. 
HROs do not attempt to hide the fact that human error is inevitable. However, they seek 
to avoid, trap, or mitigate the consequences of such errors by encouraging employees to 
routinely check for errors (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). This encouragement 
starts at the top levels of the organization (i.e., management) and filters down to the sharp 
end. The purpose is not to place blame and point fingers when an error occurs (Hofmann 
& Stetzer, 1998; Westrum, 1987, as cited in Pidgeon & O’Leary, 1994). Rather, the cause 
of the error(s) is investigated (not just the outcome of the incident) and when its cause is 
determined, the whole organization learns from it (Barling & Zacharatos, 1999).  
In light of the above discussion, it is no surprise that most individuals do not want 
to admit their mistakes. In the past, errors in healthcare have often justified and 
rationalized due to the complex and subjective nature of medicine (Pietro et al., 2000). To 
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further complicate the issue, healthcare providers are not obligated to report errors that do 
not meet certain criteria. In a study that looked at the impact of mandatory, non-
confidential error reporting systems, it was found that these systems highly discouraged 
error reporting (Weissman et al., 2005). Reasons provided for not disclosing or further 
investigating errors are risk of negative publicity and legal actions, high costs, lack of 
standards for what is an unacceptable error, and lack of justification to conduct such an 
investigation (Pietro et al., 2000). However, in a study conducted by Carroll and 
Edmondson (2002), it was found that teams who were able to openly discuss adverse 
experiences that occurred in the operating room excelled at learning over teams who 
faced communication barriers. Mohr, Abelson, & Barach (2002) suggest that a culture of 
learning is a useful intervention for improving patient safety. In other words, in 
environments where there was a fear of retribution for reporting an error (i.e., a lack of a 
non-punitive culture), employees will tend not to report errors that aren’t deemed 
‘reportable’ (e.g., where patient harm occurred), therefore resulting in lost data points 
from which to learn. Given what we know regarding the influence of upper level 
management, it is expected that hospital management support for patient safety initiatives 
would be highly related to whether or not a non-punitive culture is in place. 
To overcome these barriers, one HRO community (i.e., aviation) has encouraged 
a culture of learning by utilizing an anonymous, voluntary reporting system. The 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) was developed by the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) for the aviation community, allowing general and 
commercial aviation pilots and/or crewmembers to report errors and unsafe acts that 
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occurred during a flight without providing discernible information about themselves. The 
aviation industry has been extremely successful since its inception and receives more 
than 32,000 reports each year (Orlady & Orlady, 1999). The data collected from ASRS 
has allowed the aviation community to react to errors proactively by incorporating critical 
incidents that occur frequently into training (Sexton, Thomas, & Helmreich, 2000). The 
data is not only useful for training purposes, but it is also provides an awareness to other 
aviation professionals via publication in periodicals and the Internet. The success of 
ASRS has led to the development of similar systems in other organizations, for example 
the healthcare, nuclear and petrochemical domains (e.g., Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 
1999; Helmreich, 2000). This is encouraging given the high number of errors that occur 
each year, especially in healthcare. 
Hypothesis 17. Hospital management support for safety is positively correlated 
with a non-punitive response to error. 
Hypothesis 18a. A non-punitive response to errors will be significantly related to 
number of events reported, specifically when a non-punitive culture is in place employees 
will report more events they observe. 
Hypothesis 18b. Willingness to report events partially mediates the relationship 
between a non-punitive response to errors and number of events reported. 
Hypothesis 19a. A non-punitive culture will be significantly related to unit 
reporting rates, specifically when a non-punitive culture is in place there will be a higher 
ratio of events to patient days within units. 
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Hypothesis 19b. Willingness to report events partially mediates the relationship 
between a non-punitive response to errors and unit reporting rates. 
 
Commitment to Resilience 
 
Most organizations focus almost to exclusion on anticipating unexpected events. 
While HROs anticipate where possible, they also recognize that within complex 
environments the ability to perfectly predict the unexpected is almost impossible due to 
weak signals and uncertain environments (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Therefore, in 
addition to anticipation HROs promote a commitment to resilience or the ability to 
recover from errors. Whereas anticipation seeks to perfectly predict and therefore avoid 
unexpected events, resilience is concerned with containing or managing those unexpected 
events that have already happened. 
Building off the work of Wildavsky, resilience has been defined as being 
“mindful about errors that have already occurred and to correct them before they worsen 
and cause more serious harm” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 67). While the concept of 
resilience admits to the fact that organizations may have to play ‘catch up’, a strategy 
which balances anticipation with resilience is safer than one that relies on anticipation 
alone. Specifically, it has been argued that an organizational strategy which commits 
solely to anticipation is dangerous within complex environments for it presumes a level 
of understanding that is impossible to obtain and provides a false sense of security 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Commitment to resilience can be promoted in healthcare 
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through management support for patient safety (e.g., appropriate resources, such as 
adequate staffing) and the development of a learning culture (see above discussion). As a 
discussion of the importance of a learning culture has already been discussed, here a 
discussion of the importance of adequate resources, specifically staffing, in HROs is 
provided. 
 
Staffing 
 
 
Staffing in organizations, especially healthcare, is of the utmost importance. After 
all, it is the front line staff that has direct contact with the patient. Furthermore, staff 
members are the last line of defense in mitigating errors that can lead to adverse 
consequences. The research examining staffing and safety culture has studied the 
relationship from a number of perspectives. While some have looked at characteristics of 
the staff, including age, tenure and staff position, others have looked at staffing levels. 
For example, Castle and colleagues (2006; 2007) found that nursing homes with higher 
levels reported higher safety culture scores. Staffing can be measured in terms of 
adequate staff members to handle workload, minimize amount of overtime required, and 
limited temporary staff. 
Hypothesis 20. Staff turnover will be correlated with perceptions of staffing, 
overall perceptions of safety and patient safety grade. 
Hypothesis 21. Staffing will partially mediate the relationship between hospital 
management support for safety and overall perceptions of safety. 
37 
 
Deference to Expertise 
 
The last characteristic that enables HROs to contain, as well as identify, the 
unexpected is a deference to expertise. Within the predominant number of mainstream 
organizations, authority is closely tied to organizational hierarchy and rank. HROs are not 
bound by this norm. HROs teach members to value expertise wherever it might lie, as 
well as training organizational members to recognize expertise (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001). This enables the organization to use and recombine its resources (i.e., personnel 
and knowledge) in the most efficient manner possible. Organizations can foster a 
deference to expertise by encouraging openness of communication between all levels of 
the organization. As it may not always be senior team members (e.g., surgeon) who have 
the most expertise in a given situation, it is important for less senior members (e.g., 
nurse) to feel comfortable speaking up and offering their expertise. Along the same line, 
members within HROs share common goals (e.g., patient safety) and therefore are more 
willing to provide and receive feedback to meet these goals. Therefore, HROs encourage 
team members to speak up (i.e., assert themselves by clearly, directly, and respectfully 
communicating their concerns, ideas, etc.) when an error has been detected regardless of 
who committed the error. 
 
Communication openness and errors 
 
Within the aviation community, a lack of communication openness (or 
assertiveness) among crew members has led to a number of accidents. A review by the 
38 
 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) of 37 major air carrier accidents revealed 
that in more than 80% of the accidents, the first officer failed to adequately monitor 
and/or challenge actions taken by the captain (NTSB, 1994). Had the first officer done so, 
it is possible that these accidents could have been prevented. Assertiveness training has 
proven successful among team members within the aviation community, which has 
shown to reduce the risk of errors (Jentsch, 1997; Smith-Jentsch, Jentsch, Payne & Salas, 
1996). Assertiveness has also been deemed a critical skill for crew resource management 
(CRM) and management is supporting assertiveness by its incorporation into a number of 
training programs (see Salas, Wilson, Burke, Wightman & Howse, 2006). In a study 
conducted by Orasanu and colleagues (1999), it was found that pilots differentiate 
between situations that relate to safety and those that do not. In situations in which the 
safety of the flight is in jeopardy, all pilots (regardless of position) will assert themselves. 
When non-safety related issues are at hand (e.g., CRM issues), crew member position 
does play a role. Specifically, first officers and flight engineers (i.e., junior positions) 
recognize that in these situations it may not be appropriate to intervene. Captains, on the 
other hand, are more likely to intervene regardless of the issue.  
While deference to expertise is one area in which the healthcare domain has 
struggled due to its strict hierarchy and professional culture, it is nevertheless critical for 
patient safety and must be promoted from the top down. In 1967, Stein (as cited in 
Zwarentstein & Reeves, 2002) outlined the ‘rules’ of the ‘doctor-nurse game’. 
Specifically, it was stated that the physicians (i.e., the ‘dominant male’) are responsible 
for issues surrounding diagnosing, operating, and prescribing patient care, whereas nurses 
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(i.e., females) are responsible for less clinical tasks such as housekeeping and patient 
service. While many doctors and nurses used to assume the aforementioned roles, much 
has changed in healthcare. Almost 25 years later, Stein and colleagues (1990) wrote a 
follow up to his original article in which it was found there has been somewhat of an 
equalization of the sexes and professions, where nurses and physicians have more open 
lines of communication. Although there has been significant improvements, the research 
continues to indicate that barriers do exist. For example, research by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) has indicated that approximately 60% of 
healthcare workers agree that communication openness exists in their hospitals (AHRQ, 
2007). This indicates that a significant number of employees (40%) still feel 
uncomfortable speaking up to those of more authority. Despite this, assertiveness among 
the ranks has been deemed critical in the operating room, especially for anesthetists (e.g., 
Greaves & Grant, 2000; Fletcher, Flin, McGeorge, Glavin, Maran, & Patey, 2003; Flin, 
Fletcher, McGeorge, Sutherland, & Patey, 2003). In a study by Flin et al. (2003), only 6% 
of participants believed that junior team members should not question decisions of senior 
personnel in the operating room. While the research on assertiveness in healthcare has 
primarily focused on the operating room, the importance of assertiveness should not stop 
there—it is important in all units, especially when patient safety is threatened. 
Supervisors and management must encourage providers to speak up in a polite yet 
persistent manner, rather than hint and hope, until their concern is heard (Leonard et al., 
2004). This support will in turn lead to greater openness among the ranks and reduce the 
risk of incidents. In sum, deference to expertise allows teams within HROs to take full 
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advantage of the potential synergy available within the team in any given situation, 
regardless of rank, in order to reduce the risk of incidents and improve patient care. 
Hypothesis 22. Communication openness partially mediates the relationship 
between supervisor expectations and incidents. 
Hypothesis 23. Communication openness partially mediates the relationship 
between supervisor expectations and overall perceptions of safety. 
Hypothesis 24. Communication openness partially mediates the relationship 
between supervisor expectations and patient safety grade. 
Hypothesis 25. Communication openness partially mediates the relationship 
between hospital management support and incidents. 
Hypothesis 26. Communication openness partially mediates the relationship 
between hospital management support and overall perceptions of safety. 
Hypothesis 27. Communication openness partially mediates the relationship 
between hospital management support and patient safety grade. 
 
Summary 
 
While the above discussion focuses on safety culture across all industries, a closer 
look will be taken to understand patient safety culture in healthcare. A majority of the 
literature found has focused on predictors of safety culture or has looked at safety culture 
in general as a mediator between management actions and safe practices. For example, 
higher levels of teamwork (Rudman et al., 2006), units with higher levels of registered 
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nurses on staff (Castle, 2006), greater situation awareness (Galvan, Bacha, Mohr, & 
Barach, 2005), and greater exposure to risk (Lymer, Richt & Isaksson, 2004) leads to 
more positive safety cultures in healthcare organizations. Few articles were found that 
examined the impact of safety culture on patient safety outcomes. For example, it was 
found that overall safety climate is significantly related to medication errors.  
Within other industries beyond healthcare, research suggests that safety culture is 
related to an organizations’ safety level (e.g., Zohar, 1980; Diaz & Cabrera, 1997). This 
research suggests that a positive safety climate improves worker attitudes which leads to 
a motivation to perform safe behaviors and ultimately safety in the organization. 
Additionally, it has been found that management commitment to safety greatly influences 
the success of a safety program (e.g., DePasquale & Geller, 1999; Smith, Cohen, Cohen, 
and Cleveland, 1978). For example, employees’ perceptions of management’s 
commitment to safety (e.g., support of training) have resulted in fewer injuries on the job 
(e.g., Zohar, 2000). Another significant finding indicates the benefits of employee 
involvement in safety practices (e.g., training; DePasquale and Geller, 1999). Employee 
involvement was shown to lead to greater trust within the organization between 
management and coworkers. Finally, research suggests that compliance with safety 
policies and procedures is influenced by employee knowledge and motivation (Neal, 
Griffin, and Hart, 2000), enforcement (Halter & Drury, 2002), and possibly adherence by 
other employees (Hong, Kim, Kritkausky, and Rahid, 1998). 
The research available in the literature is useful in that it informs us that safety 
culture is important in organizations and we understand what influences it. However, 
42 
 
many of these studies focus on safety culture or climate in general rather than examining 
which factors of safety culture or climate impacted those outcomes. This dissertation 
seeks to address this issue by gathering data by diagnosing perceptions of safety culture 
along multiple dimensions and examining the impact of these perceptions on patient 
safety outcomes.  
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SECTION 3 - METHOD 
Materials and Measures 
 
AHRQ Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 
 
The data used as a part of this research was a part of a previously administered 
safety culture survey, specifically the AHRQ Hospital Survey on Patient Safety 
(HSOPS). The HSOPS survey consists of 44 items related to 14 dimensions within a 
hospital (see APPENDIX B: HOSPITAL SURVEY ON PATIENT SAFETY). The 14 
dimensions are further categorized as relating to safety culture dimensions at the unit 
level, safety culture dimensions at the hospital level, and safety culture outcomes. 
Previous testing of the AHRQ survey indicated good psychometric properties. Cronbach 
alpha for each of the dimensions ranged from .63 to .84. 
Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with 
each item. Responses were on a 5-point Likert scale from strongly agree (5) to strongly 
disagree (1), or always (5) to never (1), depending on the dimension. In addition, there 
were two single-item questions on the scale asking participants to report the number of 
events they have reported in the last 12 months and to give their work unit an overall 
patient safety grade (A-F). A majority of the survey was unit based, such that respondents 
completed the survey with respect to their experiences in a particular unit or patient care 
area. Several items asked participants to focus on the hospital as a whole. The survey also 
collected data related to hospital campus, primary work area/unit, and staff position, as 
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well as demographic items (e.g., age, sex). The HSOPS thus provided feedback grouped 
at a variety of levels, including hospital, unit, and staff position. The time to complete the 
survey was approximately 10-15 minutes. 
 
Reliability Analysis 
 
Reliability of the HSOPS was assessed by running internal consistency tests on 
the 44 items to determine the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for each of the 14 dimensions. 
Likewise of previous studies demonstrating the reliability of the scale, moderate to high 
alpha coefficients were found (see Table 5). Given this, items were collapsed into their 
respective dimensions and mean scores were calculated for each of the 14 dimensions for 
each participant. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Patient safety grade 
 
This variable is measured as a part of the AHRQ HSOPS. It is a one item question 
in which participants were asked to “Please give your work area/unit in this hospital an 
overall grade on patient safety”. Response choices ranged from a grade of A to F. 
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Overall perceptions of safety 
 
This variable is also measures as a part of the AHRQ HSOPS. It is calculated 
based on the mean responses to a set of four items—(1) Patient safety is never sacrificed 
to get more work done, (2) Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors 
from happening, (3) It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t happen around 
here (reverse worded) and (4) We have patient safety problems in this unit (reverse 
worded). Participants were asked to respond to these statements on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). A mean closer to five indicates 
more positive perceptions of safety in a particular unit. 
 
Number of events reported 
 
Number of events reported is a third outcome measure collected using the AHRQ 
HSPOS. It is a one item question asking participants to indicate the number of events that 
they have reported in their unit over the last 12 months. Response choices were none, one 
to two, three to five, six to 10, 11 to 20, and 21 or more. 
 
Unit reporting rates 
 
Unit reporting rates were collected independent of the HSOPS by the hospital’s 
Risk Management department. Unit reporting rates were calculated based on the number 
of events reported per patient days in a particular unit over a period of 12 months. 
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Incidents 
 
Incidents were also collected independent of the HSOPS by the hospital’s Risk 
Management department and categorized by the type of incident that occurred. An event 
is considered an incident if it meets the federal and state regulations for reporting (i.e., 
unexpected occurrence of or risk thereof death or serious physical or psychological injury 
to a patient). Incident data was collected by each unit over a 12 month period. 
 
Staff turnover 
 
Staff turnover data was collected by the hospital, independent of the patient safety 
survey administered as a part of this research. Staff turnover is based on the number of 
staff who separated or were acquired by a unit. Staff turnover is presented as a percentage 
of the separation (or accession) number divided by the total number of staff in that unit. 
This data was gathered over a 12 month period. 
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Table 5 
Safety culture dimensions measured by HSOPS survey, associated survey items and reliabilities. 
Safety Culture Dimensions (Unit Level) 
Supervisor 
Expectations 
about Safety 
Organizational 
Learning 
Communication 
Openness 
Teamwork 
Within Hospital 
Units 
Feedback and 
Communication 
about Error 
Non-punitive 
Response To 
Error 
Staffing 
α= .77 α= .67 α= .73 α= .79 α= .74 α= .76 α= .63 
My supervisor/ 
manager says a good 
word when he/she 
sees a job done 
according to 
established patient 
safety procedures. 
We are actively 
doing things to 
improve patient 
safety. 
Staff will freely 
speak up if they see 
something that may 
negatively affect 
patient care. 
People support one 
another in this unit. 
We are given 
feedback about 
changes put into 
place based on 
event reports. 
Staff feel like their 
mistakes are held 
against them. (r) 
We have enough 
staff to handle the 
workload. 
My supervisor/ 
manager seriously 
considers staff 
suggestions for 
improving patient 
safety. 
Mistakes have led 
to positive changes 
here. 
Staff feel free to 
question the 
decisions or actions 
of those with more 
authority. 
When a lot of work 
needs to be done 
quickly, we work 
together as a team 
to get the work 
done. 
We are informed 
about errors that 
happen in this unit. 
When an event is 
reported, it feels 
like the person is 
being written up, 
not the problem. (r) 
Staff in this unit 
work longer hours 
than is best for 
patient care. (r) 
Whenever pressure 
builds up, my 
supervisor/ manager 
wants us to work 
faster, even if it 
means taking 
shortcuts. (r)  
After we make 
changes to improve 
patient safety, we 
evaluate their 
effectiveness. 
Staff are afraid to 
ask questions when 
something does not 
seem right. (r) 
In this unit, people 
treat each other 
with respect. 
In this unit, we 
discuss ways to 
prevent errors from 
happening again. 
Staff worry that 
mistakes they make 
are kept in their 
personnel file. (r) 
We use more 
agency/ temporary 
staff than is best for 
patient care. (r) 
My supervisor/ 
manager overlooks 
patient safety 
problems that happen 
over and over. (r) 
  When one area in 
this unit gets really 
busy, others help 
out. 
  We work in “crisis 
mode”, trying to do 
too much, too 
quickly. (r) 
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Safety Culture Dimensions (Hospital Level) 
Teamwork Across Hospital Units Hospital Management Support for Patient 
Safety 
Hospital Handoffs & Transitions 
α= .78 α= .78 α= .80 
There is good cooperation among hospital 
units that need to work together. 
Hospital management provides a work climate 
that promotes patient safety. 
Things “fall between the cracks” when 
transferring patients from one unit to another. 
(r) 
Hospital units work well together to provide 
the best care for patients. 
The actions of hospital management show that 
patient safety is a top priority. 
Important patient care information is often lost 
during shift changes. (r) 
Hospital units do not coordinate well with each 
other. (r) 
Hospital management seems interested in 
patient safety only after an adverse event 
happens. (r) 
Problems often occur in the exchange of 
information across hospital units. (r) 
It is often unpleasant to work with staff from 
other hospital units. (r) 
 Shift changes are problematic for patients in 
this hospital. (r) 
Outcome Measures 
Patient Safety Grade Overall Perceptions of Safety Frequency of Event Reporting Number of Events Reported 
Single item response α= .77 α= .85 Single item response 
Please give your work area/unit in 
this hospital an overall grade on 
patient safety. 
Patient safety is never sacrificed 
to get more work done. 
When a mistake is made, but is 
caught and corrected before 
affecting the patient, how often is 
it reported? 
In the past 12 months, how many 
event reports have you filled out 
and submitted? 
 Our procedures and systems are 
good at preventing errors from 
happening. 
When a mistake is made that 
could harm the patient, how often 
is it reported? 
 
 It is just by chance that more 
serious mistakes don’t happen 
around here. (r) 
When a mistake is made that 
could harm the patient, but does 
not, how often is it reported? 
 
 We have patient safety problems 
in this unit. (r) 
  
Note: r = item is reverse worded 
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Procedure 
 
The survey was distributed through an online link available via an email sent to 
all hospital employees as well as the hospital’s intranet in June 5-July 9, 2006 (see 
APPENDIX B: HOSPITAL SURVEY ON PATIENT SAFETY). In addition, English 
and Spanish paper-based surveys were made available to employees not wishing to 
complete the survey online. Participants were informed that responses were anonymous. 
A waiver of informed consent and HIPAA authorization was granted through Florida 
Hospital’s and UCF’s Institutional Review Boards. All employees were invited to 
participate in the survey; however, for the purposes of this study, only critical areas in the 
hospital were examined. Completed survey data was sent to the author as a consultant 
hired by the hospital, who also completed subsequent data analyses for the hospital. 
Incidents (i.e., categorized by type of incident) and unit reporting rates (i.e., number of 
events reported per patient days in unit) were gathered independently of the survey data 
over a one year time period—January 2006 – December 2006. This study was approved 
by the UCF Institutional Review Board (APPENDIX C: UCF INSTITIONAL REVIEW 
BOARD APPROVAL LETTER). 
 
Power Analysis 
 
A power analysis was done to determine the minimum number of sites and 
participants within sites needed to find desired effects sizes. The conventional power 
level of .80 and alpha level of .05 were used. Raudenbush and Liu (2000) was used to 
gauge appropriate effect size for this study, who suggest 0.05, 0.10, and 0.15 as small, 
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medium and large effect sizes, respectively. Selecting a medium effect size, it is 
suggested that 20 sites with 20 participants in each site be used to gain sufficient power. 
Theoretically, the 5 (units) x 7 (campus) nature of the design led to the potential that 35 
unit by location sites would be available, well above that as recommended by 
Raudenbush and Liu (2000). However, given the fact that not all units are located at each 
site, this number of groups used in this study is slightly smaller. In addition, sites with 
less than 20 participants were excluded from the data analysis. Twenty-three sites were 
thus included in this study (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6 
List of sites (location and unit type) included in research and number of participants at 
each site 
Site ID Location Unit Type N 
1 Altamonte Intensive Care Unit 23 
2 Altamonte Emergency Department 66 
3 Altamonte Perinatal 24 
4 Altamonte Surgery 55 
5 Apopka Emergency Department 51 
6 Celebration Intensive Care Unit 30 
7 Celebration Emergency Department 56 
8 Celebration Perinatal 28 
9 Celebration Surgery 26 
10 East Orlando Intensive Care Unit 34 
11 East Orlando Emergency Department 114 
12 East Orlando Surgery 38 
13 East Orlando Pediatrics 27 
14 Kissimmee Emergency Department 38 
15 Orlando Intensive Care Unit 174 
16 Orlando Emergency Department 93 
17 Orlando Perinatal 38 
18 Orlando Surgery 149 
19 Orlando Pediatrics 250 
20 Winter Park Emergency Department 44 
21 Winter Park Perinatal 41 
22 Winter Park Surgery 34 
23 Winter Park Pediatrics 28 
  Total: 1461 
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Respondent Characteristics 
 
Survey respondents are 1461 employees of a large central Florida hospital. The 
average response rate for all hospital employees was approximately 35%. This is a 
significant improvement over 11% collected in 2005, indicating that participants are more 
willing to provide feedback to the hospital. Respondents range in age from 17 to 70 with 
a mean age of 40 years. Furthermore, 61.9% of respondents were registered nurses and 
82.5% female. The respondents come from 23 units located at seven hospital campuses 
located across central Florida. Responses per unit by campus ranged in size from 23 to 
250 staff with an average response of 64 members per unit. The staff positions of 
participants include registered nurses (N= 903), physician assistants/nurse practitioners 
(N= 19), LVN/LPN (N= 29), patient care assistant/health aide/care partner (N= 101), 
attending/staff physician (N= 42), pharmacist (N= 3), dietician (N= 4), unit 
assistant/clerk secretary (N= 86), respiratory therapist (N= 33), 
physical/occupational/speech therapist (N= 4), technician (N= 34), and 
administration/management (N= 52). In addition, 148 participants marked the “other” 
category or did not specify their staff position. 
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SECTION 4 - RESULTS 
Data Analysis 
 
All analyses were performed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) for Windows version 12.0. Unless otherwise noted, an alpha level of .05 will be 
used in all analyses. Data were screened for normality and outliers prior to analysis. To 
test the hypotheses, a mixed model approach was used and variables of interest were 
entered in as either factors or covariates, fixed or random, depending on the data. 
 
Description of Analysis Strategy: Hierarchical Linear Modeling 
 
Life dictates that individuals are embedded within groups which are embedded in 
organizations. In healthcare settings, the hierarchical structure exists such that individuals 
are nested within units which are nested in hospitals. And lower levels are influenced by 
factors at higher levels. Conventional statistics (e.g., ordinary least square), however, 
often fail to address the nested structure adequately (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) by 
aggregating lower level data to a higher level or disaggregating higher level data to a 
lower level (Hofmann, Griffin, & Gavin, 2000). On the other hand, hierarchical linear 
modeling (HLM) takes the nested structure into account and offers a more powerful 
statistical method to study the impact of attitudes and perceptions towards safety of 
individuals nested within units nested within hospitals on clinical outcomes by taking into 
consideration the within group variance. HLM is also a useful technique when size is not 
equal across groups, which is to be expected in field-based studies. 
53 
 
All hypotheses predicting direct and mediating relationships were tested with 
HLM with the exception of those predicting a relationship with the group level variables 
incidents, unit reporting rates, and staff turnover (i.e., H1, H5a-5b, H11, H14, H19a-19b, 
H20-22, and H25) and those predicting correlations (i.e., H10, H17 and H20). Mediating 
relationships were tested using the method suggested by Baron & Kenny (1986). To 
demonstrate a mediating relationship, the following steps must be established: (a) a 
significant relationship between the predictor and criterion variables, (b) a significant 
relationship between the mediating variable and both the predictor and criterion variables, 
and (c) a reduction of the relationship between the predictor and criterion variables, such 
that the relationship is less (partial mediation) or no longer (complete mediation) 
significant when the mediator is included (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
For the data collected, individuals are nested within units which are nested in 
hospital campus. A fourth variable was created that combined unit and location data to a 
single site ID to allow the data to be analyzed at just two levels (see Table 6). In sum, the 
relationship between safety attitudes and patient safety outcomes was calculated at two 
levels—Level 1: individual perceptions of patient safety and Level 2: site ID (unit type 
by campus). Results presented next are organized around the dependent variable tested. 
Table 7 provides an overview of hypotheses tested and if support was found or not.
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Table 7 
Overview of hypotheses tested 
 Prediction Supported  
 Patient Safety Grade   
Hyp 3 Supervisor expectations about patient safety are significantly related to patient 
safety grade within units, specifically positive perceptions of supervisor 
expectations will result in a higher patient safety grade. 
√ F (1,1420) = 86.41, p < .001 
Hyp 7 Hospital management support for safety is positively related to patient safety 
grade. 
√ F (1,1419) = 201.76, p < .001 
Hyp 9a Feedback and communication about errors is positively related to patient safety 
grade within units. 
√ F (1,1414) = 485.79, p < .001 
Hyp 9b Organizational learning partially mediates the relationship between feedback and 
communication about errors and patient safety grade. 
√ Feedback: F(1,962)=32.64, p < .001; 
Org learning: F(1,963)=25.36, p < .001 
Hyp 13 Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between supervisor expectations and 
patient safety grade. 
√ Sup expect: F(1,960)=22.30, p < .001; 
Teamwork: F(1, 959)=30.90, p < .001 
Hyp 16 Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between hospital management 
support and patient safety grade. 
√ Hosp mgmt: F (1,960) = 48.14, p < .001; 
Tmwk across: F(1,955)=12.35, p < .001;  
Tmwk within: F (1,958) = 31.79, p < .001 
Hyp 24 Communication openness partially mediates the relationship between supervisor 
expectations and patient safety grade. 
√ Sup expect: F(1,957)=19.85, p < .001; 
Comm: F(1,954)=11.44, p < .01 
Hyp 27 Communication openness partially mediates the relationship between hospital 
management support and patient safety grade. 
√ Hosp mgmt: F(1,960)=48.14, p < .001; 
Comm: F(1,959)=18.32, p < .001 
 Overall Perceptions of Safety   
Hyp 2 Supervisor expectations about patient safety are significantly related to overall 
perceptions of safety, specifically positive perceptions of supervisor expectations 
will result in higher levels of overall perceptions of safety. 
√ F(1,1425)=60.99, p<.01 
Hyp 6 Hospital management support for safety is positively related to overall perceptions 
of safety. 
√ F (1,1426) = 413.22, p < .001 
Hyp 8a Feedback and communication about errors is positively related to overall 
perceptions of safety. 
√ F (1,1439) = 411.72, p < .001 
Hyp 8b Organizational learning partially mediates the relationship between feedback and 
communication about errors and overall perceptions of patient safety. 
√ Feedback: F(1,962)=15.18, p < .001;  
Org learning: F(1,961)=60.84, p < .001  
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 Prediction Supported  
Hyp 12 Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between supervisor expectations and 
overall perceptions of safety. 
X Sup expect: F(1,958)=10.26, p < .01;  
Teamwork: F(1,959)=3.44, p = .064 
Hyp 15 Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between hospital management 
support and overall perceptions of safety. 
partial Hosp mgmt: F (1,956) = 71.65, p < .001;  
Tmwk across: F(1,960)=14.08, p < .001;  
Tmwk within: F (1,960) = 2.78, p = .10 
Hyp 21 Staffing will partially mediate the relationship between hospital management 
support for safety and overall perceptions of safety. 
√ Hosp mgmt: F(1,981)=71.93, p < .001; 
Staffing: F (1,911) = 131.21, p < .001 
Hyp 23 Communication openness partially mediates the relationship between supervisor 
expectations and overall perceptions of safety. 
√ Sup expect: F(1,956)=8.80, p < .01; 
Comm: F(1,952)=4.76, p < .05 
Hyp 26 Communication openness partially mediates the relationship between hospital 
management support and overall perceptions of safety. 
√ Hosp mgmt: F(1,958)=70.24, p < .001; 
Comm: F(1,959) = 7.01, p < .01 
 Number of Events Reported   
Hyp 4a Hospital management support is significantly related to number of events reported, 
specifically when hospital management supports patient safety a greater number of 
events will be reported. 
√ F (1,1368) = 22.52, p < .001 
Hyp 4b Willingness to report events partially mediates the relationship between hospital 
management support for safety and number of events reported. 
partial F (1,738) = .278, p = .598 
Hyp 18a A non-punitive response to errors will be significantly related to number of events 
reported, specifically when a non-punitive culture is in place employees will report 
more events they observe. 
X F (1,1347) = .044, p = .833 
Hyp 18b Willingness to report events partially mediates the relationship between a non-
punitive response to errors and number of events reported. 
X Not tested 
 Unit Reporting Rates   
Hyp 5a Hospital management support is significantly related to unit reporting rates, 
specifically when hospital management supports patient safety there will be a 
higher ratio of events reported to patient days within units. 
√ R2 = .016, β = .045, F(2,1343)=10.71,  
p < .001 
Hyp 5b Willingness to report events partially mediates the relationship between hospital 
management support for safety and unit reporting rates. 
√ Hosp mgmt: β = .076, p < .05;  
Willingness: β = .095,  p < .01;  
R2= .020, F(2,909)=9.42, p < .001 
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 Prediction Supported  
Hyp 19a A non-punitive culture will be significantly related to unit reporting rates, 
specifically when a non-punitive culture is in place there will be a higher ratio of 
events to patient days within units. 
√ R2 = .016, F (2,1343) = 10.71, p < .001 
Hyp 19b Willingness to report events partially mediates the relationship between a non-
punitive response to errors and unit reporting rates. 
√ Non-punitive: β= .127, p < .001; 
Willingness: β= .084, p < .05;  
R2= .030, F(2,908)=13.98, p < .001 
 Incidents   
Hyp 1 Supervisor expectations about patient safety are significantly related to incidents, 
specifically positive perceptions of supervisor expectations will result in fewer 
incidents. 
X F(2,1437) = 2.05, p = .129 
Hyp 11 Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between supervisor expectations and 
incidents. 
partial F(2,1437) = 2.05, p = .129 
Hyp 14 Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between hospital management 
support and incidents. 
X Not tested 
Hyp 22 Communication openness partially mediates the relationship between supervisor 
expectations and incidents. 
X Not tested 
Hyp 25 Communication openness partially mediates the relationship between hospital 
management support and incidents. 
X Not tested 
 Staff Turnover   
Hyp 20 Staff turnover will be correlated with perceptions of staffing, overall perceptions 
of safety and patient safety grade. 
partial Staffing: r = -.044 
Overall perceptions: r = -.080, p < .01 
PS grade: r = -.048 
 Correlations   
Hyp 10 Feedback and communication about errors will be positively correlated with 
supervisor expectations about patient safety. 
√ r = .526, p < .01 
Hyp 17 Hospital management support for safety is positively correlated with a non-
punitive response to error. 
√ r = .366, p < .01 
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Table 8 lists the means, standard deviations and intercorrelations for the 11 safety culture 
dimensions and eight outcome variables. Hypotheses 10, 17, and 20 predicted correlations 
between variables. Specifically, Hypothesis 10 stated that feedback and communication about 
errors would be positively correlated with supervisor expectations about patient safety. This 
hypothesis was supported at both the individual and group level, .526 and .697, p < .01, 
respectively. Likewise, Hypothesis 17 stated that hospital management support would be 
positively correlated with a non-punitive response to errors. This hypothesis was supported at 
both the individual and group level, .366 and .686, p < .01, respectively. Finally, Hypothesis 20 
predicted negative correlations between staff turnover and staffing, overall perceptions of safety 
and patient safety grade. Support, however, was not found between staff turnover and staffing or 
patient safety grade (at the individual or group levels). A negative relationship was found, 
however, between staff turnover and overall perceptions of safety at the individual level (r= -
.080, p < .01), but not at the group level. 
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Table 8 
Means, standard deviations and intercorrelations for safety culture dimensions and outcome variables. 
Dimension Mean SD 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  
1. Teamwork within units 3.97 .75 —        
2. Organizational learning 3.72 .68 .485** —
—
—
       
3. Non-punitive response to errors 2.95 .86 .349** .377**       
4. Supervisor expectations about safety 3.89 .77 .452** .542** .418**      
5. Feedback and communication about 
errors 
3.56 .82 .364** .512** .328** .526** —    
6. Communication openness 3.58 .80 .443** .474** .456** .545** .571** —   
7. Willingness to report errors 3.61 1.00 .246** .349** .316** .342** .488** .417 —  
8. Hospital management support for 
safety 
3.54 .85 .346** .525** .366** .517** .516** .455** .360** — 
9. Teamwork across units 3.27 .79 .365** .365** .332** .367** .406** .372** .250** .562** 
10. Handoffs and transitions 3.14 .85 .334** .315** .365** .374** .362** .361** .287** .463** 
11. Staffing 3.24 .82 .356** .328** .423** .405** .265** .340** .277** .440** 
12. Overall perceptions of safety 3.37 .86 .438** .547** .442** .516** .489** .485** .432** .630** 
13. PS grade 3.69 .91 .491** .530** .402** .540** .530** .487** .451** .600** 
14. Number of events reported 
(individual) 
1.89 1.10 .024 -.028** .002 -.008 -.112** .005 .023 -.108** 
15. Number of events reported (unit) 294.44 205.71 .050 .031 -.027 .038 -.036 .029 .028 -.009 
16. Medication events 131.12 146.52 .139** .078** .012 .099** -.016 .069** .068* .044 
17. Non-medication events 163.32 103.96 -.097** -.049 -.07** -.065** -.048 -.042 -.047 -.081** 
18. Unit reporting rates 1.48 1.33 .028 .090** .096** .050 .055* .067* .124** .116** 
19. Staff turnover .067 .108 .035 -.021 .012 .024 -.026 .018 -.046 -.030 
*p < 0.05 (2-tailed). **p < 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Dimension 9.  10.  11.  12.  13.  14.  15.  16.  17.  18.  
1. Teamwork within units           
2. Organizational learning           
3. Non-punitive response to 
errors 
          
4. Supervisor expectations about 
safety 
          
5. Feedback and communication 
about errors 
          
6. Communication openness           
7. Willingness to report errors           
8. Hospital management support 
for safety 
          
9. Teamwork across units —          
10. Handoffs and transitions .647** —         
11. Staffing .352** .392** —        
12. Overall perceptions of safety .490** .464** .583** —       
13. PS grade .474** .434** .480** .697** —      
14. Number of events reported 
(individual) 
-.110** -.148** .008 -.105** -.085** —     
15. Number of events reported 
(unit) 
.028 .002 .177** 0.045 0.04 .012 —    
16. Medication events .085** .062* .273** .138** .119** .022 .879** —   
17. Non-medication events -.066* -.085** -.036 -.106** -.091** -.009 .740** .330** —  
18. Unit reporting rates .179** .133** .126** .174** .163** .077** -.064* -.002 -.124** — 
19. Staff turnover -.010 .003 -.044 -.080** -.048 .013 .061* .369** .236** .397** 
*p < 0.05 (2-tailed). **p < 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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DV: Overall Perceptions of Safety 
 
Hypotheses 2, 6, 8a, 8b, 12, 15, 21, 23 and 26 predicted relationships involving 
the dependent variable ‘overall perceptions of safety’. These analyses were conducted at 
the individual level using HLM. 
 
Supervisor Expectations about Safety and Overall Perceptions of Safety 
 
Hypothesis 2 stated that supervisor expectations about patient safety would be 
significantly and positively related to overall perceptions of safety (see Table 9). As 
hypothesized, HLM analysis revealed a significant relationship, when controlling for 
hospital management support and feedback and communication about errors, F (1,1425) 
= 60.99, p < .01. Specifically, in units with higher levels of supervisor expectations 
regarding safety, individuals within those units had higher perceptions of safety. 
 
Table 9 
HLM analysis of supervisor expectations about patient safety and overall perceptions of 
safety 
Model Predictor Criterion Estimate SE t df 
1 Supervisor expectations 
about patient safety 
Hospital management 
support 
Feedback and 
communication 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.21 
 
.41 
 
.16 
.03 
 
.02 
 
.02 
7.81***
 
17.26***
 
6.64***
1,1425 
 
1,1421 
 
1,1423 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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With support found for the positive relationship between supervisor expectations 
and overall perceptions of safety (Hyp 2), hypotheses 12 and 23 predict partial mediation 
of this relationship. First, Hypothesis 12 stated that teamwork partially mediates the 
relationship between supervisor expectations and overall perceptions of safety (see Table 
10). The relationship between supervisor expectations and teamwork, using hospital 
management support as a covariate, also indicated a positive relationship, F (1,1434) = 
40.70, p < .001. Additional support was also found for the relationship between 
teamwork within units and overall perceptions of safety, F (1,963) = 4.36, p < .05. 
Finally, although the previous relationships were significant, the mediation predicted in 
the hypothesis is not supported (supervisor expectations: F (1,958) = 10.26, p < .01; 
teamwork within units: F (1,959) = 3.44, p = .064). 
 
62 
 
Table 10 
HLM analysis predicting teamwork within units as a mediating variable between 
supervisor expectations and overall perceptions of safety 
Model Predictor Criterion Estimate SE t df 
1 Supervisor expectations 
about patient safety 
Hospital management 
support 
Feedback and 
communication 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.21 
 
.41 
 
.16 
.03 
 
.02 
 
.02 
7.81***
 
17.26***
 
6.64***
1,1425 
 
1,1421 
 
1,1423 
2 Supervisor expectations 
Hospital management 
support 
Teamwork within 
units 
.35 
 
.15 
.03 
 
.02 
13.22***
 
6.38*** 
1,1435 
 
1,1434 
3 Teamwork within units 
Willingness to report errors 
Staffing 
Communication openness 
Organizational learning 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.07 
.14 
.37 
.12 
.33 
.03 
.02 
.03 
.03 
.04 
2.087*
6.27***
13.69***
3.95***
9.01***
1,963 
1,963 
1,893 
1,959 
1,964 
4 Supervisor expectations 
Teamwork within units 
Willingness to report errors 
Staffing 
Communication openness 
Organizational learning 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.11 
.06 
.13 
.36 
.09 
.29 
.03 
.03 
.02 
.03 
.03 
.04 
3.20** 
1.85 
6.10***
13.07***
2.79** 
7.65***
1,958 
1,959 
1,959 
1,903 
1,952 
1,960 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
As previously discussed, Hypothesis 2 was supported (supervisor expectations are 
positively related to overall perceptions of safety). Hypothesis 23 stated that 
communication openness will partially mediate this relationship (see Table 11). The 
direct relationship between supervisor expectations and communication openness was 
tested first. Using hospital management support as a covariate, results showed that 
supervisor expectations is positively related to communication openness, F (1,1285) = 
279.78, p < .001. Next, HLM analysis also revealed a positive relationship between 
communication openness and overall perceptions of safety when using covariates, F 
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(1,960) = 10.79, p < .01. Finally, as predicted, a partially mediating relationship was 
found (supervisor expectations: F (1,956) = 8.80, p < .01; communication openness: F 
(1,952) = 4.76, p < .05). 
 
Table 11 
HLM analysis predicting communication openness as a mediating variable between 
supervisor expectations and overall perceptions of safety. 
Model Predictor Criterion Estimate SE t df 
1 Supervisor expectations 
about patient safety 
Hospital management 
support 
Feedback and 
communication 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.21 
 
.41 
 
.16 
.03 
 
.02 
 
.02 
7.81*** 
 
17.26***
 
6.64***
1,1425 
 
1,1421 
 
1,1423 
2 Supervisor expectations  
Hospital management 
support 
Communication 
openness 
.44 
 
.22 
.03 
 
.02 
16.73***
 
9.17*** 
1,1285 
 
1,1342 
3 Communication openness 
Teamwork within units 
Teamwork across units 
Willingness to report errors 
Staffing 
Organizational learning 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.09 
.04 
.21 
.13 
.33 
.30 
.03 
.03 
.03 
.02 
.03 
.04 
3.00** 
1.17 
7.51*** 
6.04*** 
12.30***
8.44***
1,957 
1,960 
1,961 
1,959 
1,903 
1,960 
4 Supervisor expectations 
Communication openness 
Teamwork across units 
Willingness to report errors 
Staffing 
Organizational learning 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.10 
.07 
.21 
.13 
.32 
.28 
.03 
.03 
.03 
.02 
.03 
.04 
2.97** 
2.18* 
7.58*** 
5.89*** 
12.07***
7.80***
1,956 
1,952 
1,958 
1,956 
1,908 
1,956 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Hospital Management Support and Overall Perceptions of Safety 
 
Hypothesis 6 stated that hospital management support for safety is positively 
related to overall perceptions of patient safety (see Table 12). As predicted, higher levels 
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of hospital management support leads to greater overall perceptions of patient safety, F 
(1,1441) = 800.94, p < .001. A significant effect of group membership was also found (p 
= .006). Using supervisor expectations as a covariate, this hypothesis was further 
supported in that hospital management support uniquely contributes to overall 
perceptions of patient safety, F (1,1426) = 413.22, p < .001. 
 
Table 12 
HLM analysis of hospital management support and overall perceptions of safety 
Model Predictor Criterion Estimate SE t df 
1 Hospital management 
support 
Supervisor expectations 
about patient safety 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.46 
 
.27 
.02 
 
.03 
20.34***
 
10.68***
1,1426 
 
1,1429 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
With support found for the positive relationship between hospital management 
support and overall perceptions of safety (Hyp 6), hypotheses 15, 21 and 26 predict 
partial mediation of this relationship. Hypothesis 15 stated that teamwork partially 
mediates this relationship (see Table 13). HLM analysis revealed a positive relationship 
between hospital management support and both teamwork within units (F (1,1445) = 
189.87, p < .001) and teamwork across units (F (1,1441) = 617.36, p < .001). Using 
covariates, teamwork across units contributed uniquely to overall perceptions of safety (F 
(1,961) = 56.33, p < .001), however, teamwork within units did not (F (1,960) = 1.379, p 
= .241). Next, hospital management support was entered into the analysis to test for 
partial mediation. This hypothesis was partially supported as hospital management 
support and teamwork across units were significant, but teamwork within units was not 
65 
 
(hospital management support: F (1,956) = 71.65, p < .001; teamwork across units: F 
(1,960) = 14.08, p < .001; teamwork within units: F (1,960) = 2.78, p = .10). 
 
Table 13 
HLM analysis predicting teamwork as a mediating variable between hospital 
management support for safety and overall perceptions of safety 
Model Predictor Criterion Estimate SE t df 
1 Hospital management 
support 
Supervisor expectations 
about patient safety 
Feedback and 
communication 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.41 
 
.21 
.16 
.02 
 
.03 
 
.02 
17.26***
 
7.81***
 
6.64***
1,1421 
 
1,1425 
 
1,1423 
2 Hospital management 
support 
Supervisor expectations 
Teamwork 
within units 
.15 
 
.35 
.02 
 
.03 
6.38*** 
 
13.22***
1,1434 
 
1,1435 
3 Teamwork within units 
Teamwork across units 
Willingness to report errors 
Staffing 
Communication openness 
Organizational learning 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.04 
.21 
.13 
.33 
.09 
.30 
.03 
.03 
.02 
.03 
.03 
.04 
1.17 
7.51***
6.04***
12.30***
3.00** 
8.44***
1,960 
1,961 
1,959 
1,903 
1,957 
1,960 
4 Hospital management 
support 
Teamwork across units 
Willingness to report errors 
Staffing 
Communication openness 
Organizational learning 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.24 
 
.12 
.11 
.30 
.07 
.25 
.03 
 
.03 
.02 
.03 
.03 
.03 
8.38***
 
4.02***
5.19***
11.33***
7.45** 
2.65***
1,958 
 
1,961 
1,960 
1,888 
1,959 
1,960 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Similarly, Hypothesis 21 predicted that staffing would partially mediate the 
previously supported relationship between hospital management support and overall 
perceptions of safety (see Table 14). First, the relationship between hospital management 
support and staffing was tested. HLM analysis indicated a positive relationship between 
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the two variables, F (1,1464) = 270.38, p < .001. Using covariates, the relationship 
between staffing and overall perceptions of safety was also positive, F (1,926) = 154.74, 
p < .001. Finally, HLM analysis supported the hypothesis in that staffing mediated the 
relationship between hospital management support and overall perceptions of safety 
(hospital management: F (1,981) = 71.93, p < .001; staffing: F (1,911) = 131.21, p < 
.001). 
 
Table 14 
HLM analysis predicting staffing as a mediating variable between hospital management 
support and overall perceptions of safety 
Model Predictor Criterion Estimate SE t df 
1 Hospital management 
support 
Supervisor expectations 
about patient safety 
Feedback and 
communication 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.41 
 
.21 
 
.16 
.02 
 
.03 
 
.02 
17.26***
 
7.81***
 
6.64***
1,1421 
 
1,1425 
 
1,1423 
2 Hospital management 
support 
Staffing .35 .02 16.44*** 1,1464 
3 Staffing 
Communication openness 
Teamwork within units 
Teamwork across units 
Willingness to report errors 
Organizational learning 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.33 
.09 
.04 
.21 
.13 
.30 
.03 
.03 
.03 
.03 
.02 
.04 
12.44***
3.04** 
1.19 
7.60***
6.11***
8.54***
1,926 
1,980 
1,984 
1,984 
1,982 
1,983 
4 Hospital management 
support 
Staffing 
Communication openness 
Teamwork across units 
Willingness to report errors 
Organizational learning 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.24 
 
.30 
.07 
.12 
.11 
.25 
.03 
 
.03 
.03 
.03 
.02 
.03 
8.48***
 
11.46***
2.68** 
4.08***
5.24***
7.54***
1,981 
 
1,911 
1,982 
1,984 
1,983 
1,983 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Hypothesis 26 predicted that communication openness would mediate the 
relationship between hospital management support and overall perceptions of safety (see 
Table 15). The relationship between hospital management support and communication 
openness was tested first, and HLM analysis showed a significant positive relationship 
when using supervisor expectations as a covariate, F (1,1342) = 84.09, p < .001, although 
no significant group effect was found (p = .442). Next, using covariates, the relationship 
between communication openness and overall perceptions of safety was analyzed, 
indicating that communication openness does contribute uniquely to overall perceptions 
of safety, F (1,957) = 9.00, p < .01. Finally, HLM analysis revealed a partial mediation, 
fully supporting this hypothesis (hospital management support: F (1,958) = 70.24, p < 
.001; communication openness: F (1,959) = 7.01, p < .01). 
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Table 15 
HLM analysis predicting communication openness as a mediating variable between 
hospital management support and overall perceptions of safety 
Model Predictor Criterion Estimate SE t df 
1 Hospital management 
support 
Supervisor expectations 
about patient safety 
Feedback and 
communication 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.41 
 
.21 
.16 
.02 
 
.03 
 
.02 
17.26***
 
7.81***
 
6.64***
1,1421 
 
1,1425 
 
1,1423 
2 Hospital management 
support 
Supervisor expectations 
Communication 
openness 
.22 
 
.44 
.02 
 
.03 
9.17*** 
 
16.73***
1,1342 
 
1,1285 
3 Communication openness 
Teamwork within units 
Teamwork across units 
Willingness to report errors 
Staffing 
Organizational learning 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.09 
.04 
.21 
.13 
.33 
.30 
.03 
.03 
.03 
.02 
.03 
.04 
3.00** 
1.17 
7.51***
6.04***
12.30***
8.44***
1,957 
1,960 
1,961 
1,959 
1,903 
1,960 
4 Hospital management 
support 
Communication openness 
Teamwork across units 
Willingness to report errors 
Staffing 
Organizational learning 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.24 
 
.04 
.12 
.11 
.30 
.25 
.03 
 
.03 
.03 
.02 
.03 
.03 
8.38***
 
2.65** 
4.02***
5.19***
11.33***
7.45***
1,958 
 
1,959 
1,961 
1,960 
1,888 
1,960 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Feedback and Communication about Errors and Overall Perceptions of Safety 
 
Finally, Hypothesis 8a stated that feedback and communication about errors 
would be significantly related to overall perceptions of safety (see Table 16). As 
predicted, HLM analysis indicated a positive relationship, F (1,1439) = 411.72, p < .001. 
Hypothesis 8b stated that organizational learning would partially mediate this relationship 
(see Table 16). Using covariates, this relationship was supported (feedback and 
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communication: F (1,962) = 15.18, p < .001; organizational learning: F (1,961) = 60.84, 
p < .001). 
 
Table 16 
HLM analysis predicting organizational learning as a mediating variable between 
feedback and communication about errors and overall perceptions of safety 
Model Predictor Criterion Estimate SE t df 
1 Feedback and 
communication 
Supervisor expectations 
Hospital management 
support 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.16 
 
.21 
 
.41 
.02 
 
.03 
 
.02 
3.64 
 
7.81 
 
17.26 
1,1423 
 
1,1425 
 
1,1421 
2 Feedback and 
communication 
Organizational 
learning 
.42 .02 22.04*** 1,1414 
3 Organizational learning 
Willingness to report errors 
Staffing 
Communication openness 
Teamwork within units 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.33 
.14 
.37 
.12 
.07 
.04 
.02 
.03 
.03 
.03 
9.01***
6.27***
13.69***
3.95***
3.09* 
1,964 
1,963 
1,893 
1,959 
1,963 
4 Feedback and 
communication 
Organizational learning 
Willingness to report errors 
Staffing 
Communication openness 
Teamwork within units 
Overall 
perceptions of 
safety 
.12 
 
.29 
.11 
.37 
.08 
.06 
.03 
 
.04 
.02 
.03 
.03 
.03 
3.90***
 
7.80***
4.93***
13.73***
2.48* 
1.98*
1,962 
 
1,961 
1,961 
1,891 
1,957 
1,963 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
DV: Patient Safety Grade 
 
Hypotheses 3, 7, 9a, 9b, 13, 16, 24, and 27 predicted relationships involving the 
dependent variable ‘patient safety grade’. To test these hypotheses, HLM analyses were 
conducted using individual level data. 
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Supervisor Expectations about Safety and Patient Safety Grade 
 
Hypothesis 3 stated that supervisor expectations are related to patient safety grade 
within units (see Table 17). Using hospital management support and feedback and 
communication about errors as covariates, the HLM analysis found support for this 
hypothesis, F (1,1420) = 86.41, p < .001, indicating that higher supervisor expectations 
leads to higher patient safety grade.  
 
Table 17 
HLM analysis of supervisor expectations about patient safety and patient safety grade 
Model Predictor Criterion Estimate SE t df 
1 Supervisor expectations 
about patient safety 
Hospital management 
support 
Feedback and 
communication 
Patient safety 
grade 
.27 
 
.36 
 
.25 
.03 
 
.03 
 
.03 
9.30*** 
 
14.20*** 
 
9.25*** 
1,1420 
 
1,1419 
 
1,1419 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
With support found for the positive relationship between supervisor expectations 
and patient safety grade (Hyp 3), Hypotheses 13 and 24 predict partial mediation of this 
relationship. Hypothesis 13 predicted teamwork as the mediating variable (see Table 18). 
Analyses conducted as a part of hypothesis 12 demonstrated a positive relationship 
between supervisor expectations and teamwork. To test the relationship between 
teamwork and patient safety grade, HLM analysis was run. Results show, using 
covariates, that teamwork within units does significantly contribute to patient safety 
grade, F (1,963) = 34.79, p < .001. Unlike that of hypothesis 12, support was found for 
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the mediating relationship (supervisor expectations: F (1,960) = 22.30, p < .001; 
teamwork within units: F (1, 959) = 30.90, p < .001). 
 
Table 18 
HLM analysis predicting teamwork within units as a mediating variable between 
supervisor expectations about patient safety and patient safety grade 
Model Predictor Criterion Estimate SE t df 
1 Supervisor expectations 
about patient safety 
Hospital management 
support 
Feedback and 
communication 
Patient safety 
grade 
.27 
 
.36 
 
.25 
.03 
 
.03 
 
.03 
9.30***
 
14.20***
 
9.25***
1,1420 
 
1,1419 
 
1,1419 
2 Supervisor expectations 
Hospital management 
support 
Teamwork 
within units 
.35 
 
.15 
.03 
 
.02 
13.22***
 
6.38*** 
1,1435 
 
1,1434 
3 Teamwork within units 
Willingness to report errors 
Staffing 
Communication openness 
Organizational learning 
Patient safety 
grade 
.20 
.17 
.24 
.19 
.28 
.03 
.02 
.03 
.03 
.04 
5.90***
7.37***
8.33***
5.70***
6.62***
1,963 
1,964 
1,757 
1,962 
1,963 
4 Supervisor expectations 
Teamwork within units 
Willingness to report errors 
Staffing 
Communication openness 
Organizational learning 
Patient safety 
grade 
.17 
.19 
.17 
.22 
.14 
.20 
.04 
.03 
.02 
.03 
.03 
.04 
4.72***
5.56***
7.12***
1.45***
4.07***
4.94***
1,960 
1,959 
1,960 
1,790 
1,956 
1,959 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Hypothesis 24 was analyzed at the individual level to test communication 
openness as a partial mediating factor of the relationship between supervisor expectations 
and patient safety grade (see Table 19). As proven in Hypothesis 23, supervisor support is 
positively related to communication openness. Therefore, the first step of this analysis 
was to test the relationship between communication openness and patient safety grade. 
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Using covariates, the relationship between communication openness and patient safety 
grade was tested, and a significant positive relationship was found, F (1,960) = 23.75, p < 
.001. Finally, as predicted, HLM analysis revealed a partially mediating relationship 
(supervisor expectations: F (1,957) = 19.85, p < .001; communication openness: F 
(1,954) = 11.44, p < .01). 
 
Table 19 
HLM analysis predicting communication openness as a mediating variable between 
supervisor expectations about patient safety and patient safety grade 
Model Predictor Criterion Estimate SE t df 
1 Supervisor expectations 
about patient safety 
Hospital management 
support 
Feedback and 
communication 
Patient safety 
grade 
.27 
 
.36 
 
.25 
.03 
 
.03 
 
.03 
9.30***
 
14.20***
 
9.25***
1,1420 
 
1,1419 
 
1,1419 
2 Supervisor expectations 
Hospital management 
support 
Communication 
openness 
.44 
 
.22 
.03 
 
.02 
16.73***
 
9.17*** 
1,1284 
 
1,1342 
3 Communication openness 
Teamwork within units 
Teamwork across units 
Willingness to report errors 
Staffing 
Organizational learning 
Patient safety 
grade 
.16 
.18 
.20 
.16 
.20 
.23 
.03 
.03 
.03 
.02 
.03 
.04 
4.87***
5.14***
6.68***
7.14***
7.01***
6.01***
1,960 
1,960 
1,959 
1,961 
1,780 
1,961 
4 Supervisor expectations  
Communication openness 
Teamwork within units 
Teamwork across units 
Willingness to report errors 
Staffing 
Organizational learning 
Patient safety 
grade 
.16 
.11 
.16 
.19 
.16 
.18 
.18 
.04 
.03 
.03 
.03 
.02 
.03 
.04 
4.46***
3.38** 
4.84***
6.56***
6.91***
6.23*** 
4.45***
1,957 
1,954 
1,956 
1,955 
1,957 
1,805 
1,957 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
73 
 
Hospital Management Support and Patient Safety Grade 
 
Hypothesis 7 stated that hospital management support is related to patient safety 
grade (see Table 20). Using supervisor expectations and feedback and communication 
about errors as covariates, the HLM analysis found support for this hypothesis, F 
(1,1419) = 201.76, p < .001, indicating that higher perceptions of hospital management 
support leads to a higher patient safety grade. 
 
Table 20 
HLM analysis of hospital management support for safety and patient safety grade 
Model Predictor Criterion Estimate SE t df 
1 Hospital management 
support 
Supervisor expectations 
about patient safety 
Feedback and 
communication 
Patient safety 
grade 
.36 
 
.27 
 
.25 
.03 
 
.03 
 
.03 
14.20*** 
 
9.29*** 
 
9.25*** 
1,1419 
 
1,1420 
 
1,1419 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
As support for Hypotheses 7 was found, Hypotheses 16 and 27 predict mediating 
relationships between hospital management support and patient safety grade. 
Specifically, Hypothesis 16 predicted that teamwork within and across units will partially 
mediate this relationship (see Table 21). Hypothesis 15 revealed a positive relationship 
between hospital management support and teamwork within and across units. HLM 
analysis also revealed a positive relationship between teamwork within units (F (1,960) = 
26.40, p < .001) and across units (F (1,959) = 44.59, p < .001) and patient safety grade. 
To test the partially mediating relationship, hospital management support was entered 
into the relationship. HLM analysis found support for this hypothesis (hospital 
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management support: F (1,960) = 48.14, p < .001; teamwork across units: F (1,955) = 
12.35, p < .001; teamwork within units: F (1,958) = 31.79, p < .001). 
 
 
Table 21 
HLM analysis predicting teamwork as a mediating variable between hospital 
management support and patient safety grade 
Model Predictor Criterion Estimate SE t df 
1 Hospital management 
support 
Supervisor expectations 
about patient safety 
Feedback and 
communication 
Patient safety 
grade 
.36 
 
.27 
 
.25 
.03 
 
.03 
 
.03 
14.20*** 
 
9.29*** 
 
9.25*** 
1,1419 
 
1,1420 
 
1,1419 
2 Hospital management 
support 
Supervisor expectations 
Teamwork 
within units 
.15 
 
.35 
.02 
 
.03 
6.38*** 
 
13.22***
1,1434 
 
1,1435 
3 Hospital management 
support 
Supervisor expectations 
Teamwork 
across units 
.46 
 
.11 
.02 
 
.03 
19.70***
 
4.16*** 
1,1430 
 
1,1432 
4 Teamwork within units 
Willingness to report 
errors 
Staffing 
Communication openness 
Organizational learning 
Patient safety 
grade 
.20 
.17 
 
.24 
.19 
.28 
.03 
.02 
 
.03 
.03 
.04 
5.90*** 
7.37*** 
 
8.33*** 
5.70*** 
6.62*** 
1,963 
1,964 
 
1,757 
1,962 
1,963 
5 Hospital management 
support 
Teamwork within units 
Teamwork across units 
Willingness to report 
errors 
Staffing 
Communication openness 
Organizational learning 
Patient safety 
grade 
.22 
 
.19 
.11 
.15 
 
.03 
.03 
.04 
.03 
 
.03 
.03 
.02 
 
.03 
.03 
.04 
6.94*** 
 
5.64*** 
3.52*** 
6.41*** 
 
5.67*** 
4.28*** 
4.36*** 
1,960 
 
1,958 
1,955 
1,960 
 
1,766 
1,959 
1,960 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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As hypothesis 7 was supported and differences among group membership were 
found, Hypothesis 27 (relationship between hospital management support and patient 
safety grade is partially mediated by communication openness) was analyzed using HLM 
analysis (see Table 22). First, the relationship between hospital management support and 
communication openness was tested. Using supervisor expectations about safety as a 
covariate, results indicated that higher perceptions of hospital management support leads 
to higher perceptions of communication openness, F (1,1342) = 84.09, p < .001. Using 
covariates, the relationship between communication openness and patient safety grade 
was tested, and a significant positive relationship was also found, F (1,960) = 23.75, p < 
.001. Finally, HLM analysis revealed support for the mediating relationship (hospital 
management support: F (1,960) = 48.14, p < .001; communication openness: F (1,959) = 
18.32, p < .001). 
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Table 22 
HLM analysis predicting communication openness as a mediating variable between 
hospital management support for safety and patient safety grade 
Model Predictor Criterion Estimate SE t df 
1 Hospital management 
support 
Supervisor expectations 
about patient safety 
Feedback and 
communication 
Patient safety 
grade 
.36 
 
.27 
 
.25 
.03 
 
.03 
 
.03 
14.20***
 
9.29*** 
 
9.25*** 
1,1419 
 
1,1420 
 
1,1419 
2 Hospital management 
support 
Supervisor expectations 
Communication 
openness 
.22 
 
.44 
.02 
 
.03 
9.17*** 
 
16.73*** 
1,1342 
 
1,1285 
3 Communication openness 
Teamwork within units 
Teamwork across units 
Willingness to report errors 
Staffing 
Organizational learning 
Patient safety 
grade 
.16 
.18 
.20 
.16 
.20 
.23 
.03 
.03 
.03 
.02 
.03 
.04 
4.87*** 
5.14*** 
6.68*** 
7.14*** 
7.01*** 
6.01*** 
1,960 
1,960 
1,959 
1,961 
1,780 
1,961 
5 Hospital management 
support 
Communication openness 
Teamwork within units 
Teamwork across units 
Willingness to report errors 
Staffing 
Organizational learning 
Patient safety 
grade 
.22 
 
.14 
.19 
.11 
.15 
.16 
.17 
.03 
 
.03 
.03 
.03 
.02 
.03 
.04 
6.94*** 
 
4.28*** 
5.64*** 
3.52*** 
6.41*** 
5.67*** 
4.36*** 
1,960 
 
1,959 
1,958 
1,955 
1,960 
1,766 
1,960 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Feedback and Communication about Errors and Patient Safety Grade 
 
Hypothesis 9a stated that feedback and communication about errors would be 
significantly related to patient safety grade (see Table 23). As predicted, HLM analysis 
indicated a positive relationship, F (1,1434) = 515.73, p < .001. Hypothesis 9b stated that 
organizational learning would partially mediate this relationship (see Table 23). First, the 
relationship between feedback and communication and organizational learning was tested 
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and a positive relationship was found, F (1,1414) = 485.79, p < .001. Next, using 
covariates, the relationship between organizational learning and patient safety grade was 
analyzed. HLM analysis revealed that organizational learning does contribute uniquely to 
patient safety grade, F (1,963) = 43.84, p < .001. Finally, using covariates, the partially 
mediated relationship was supported (feedback and communication: F (1,962) = 32.64, p 
< .001; organizational learning: F (1,963) = 25.36, p < .001). 
 
Table 23 
HLM analysis predicting organizational learning as a mediating variable between 
feedback and communication about errors and patient safety grade 
Model Predictor Criterion Estimate SE t df 
1 Feedback and 
communication 
Supervisor expectations 
Hospital management 
support 
Patient safety 
grade 
.16 
 
.21 
 
.41 
.02 
 
.03 
 
.02 
3.64 
 
7.81 
 
17.26 
1,1423 
 
1,1425 
 
1,1421 
2 Feedback and 
communication 
Organizational 
learning 
.42 .02 22.04*** 1,1414 
3 Organizational learning 
Willingness to report errors 
Staffing 
Communication openness 
Teamwork within units 
Patient safety 
grade 
.33 
.14 
.37 
.12 
.07 
.04 
.02 
.03 
.03 
.03 
9.01***
6.27***
13.69***
3.95***
3.09* 
1,964 
1,963 
1,893 
1,959 
1,963 
4 Feedback and 
communication 
Organizational learning 
Willingness to report errors 
Staffing 
Communication openness 
Teamwork within units 
Patient safety 
grade 
.12 
 
.29 
.11 
.37 
.08 
.06 
.03 
 
.04 
.02 
.03 
.03 
.03 
3.90***
 
7.80***
4.93***
13.73***
2.48* 
1.98*
1,962 
 
1,961 
1,961 
1,891 
1,957 
1,963 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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DV: Number of Events Reported 
 
Hypotheses 4a, 4b, 18a and 18b predicted relationships involving the dependent 
variable ‘number of events reported’. Number of events reported indicates the number of 
events reported by each participant in the last 12 months. To test these hypotheses, HLM 
analyses were conducted using individual level data. 
 
Hospital Management Support and Number of Events Reported 
 
Hypothesis 4a stated that hospital management support would be positively 
related to number of events reported by participants (see Table 24). The HLM analysis 
with the individual level data found a significant effect of hospital management support, 
F (1,1368) = 22.52, p < .001. However, the relationship found was in the opposite 
direction. Specifically, higher perceptions of hospital management support leads to fewer 
events reported by employees.  
Hypothesis 4b stated that willingness to report events partially mediates the 
relationship between hospital management support and number of events reported (see 
Table 24). Using non-punitive response to errors as a covariate, the HLM analysis 
revealed a positive relationship between hospital management support and willingness to 
report errors (F (1,964) = 62.62, p < .001). The test of the relationship between 
willingness to report events and number of events reported was not significant (F (1,738) 
= .278, p = .598). Because of this, the test of the mediating relationship was not 
continued. Therefore, only part of Hypothesis 4b was supported. The reason for this 
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could be that hospital management support not only leads to a willingness to report errors 
but also leads to a safer environment (i.e., fewer errors), and while employees are willing 
to report errors, they don’t have the opportunity. 
 
Table 24 
HLM analysis predicting willingness to report events as a mediating variable between 
hospital management support for safety and number of events reported 
Model Predictor Criterion Estimate SE t df 
1 Hospital management 
support 
Non-punitive response to 
errors 
Willingness to 
report 
.29 
 
.23 
.04 
 
.04 
7.91*** 
 
6.44*** 
1,964 
 
1,964 
2 Hospital management 
support 
Non-punitive response to 
errors 
Number of 
events reported 
-.18 
 
.05 
.04 
 
.04 
-4.95***
 
1.42 
1,1398 
 
1,1413 
3 Willingness to report Number of 
events reported 
.02 .04 .527 1,737 
4 Hospital management 
support 
Willingness to report 
Number of 
events reported 
-.12 
 
.05 
.044 
 
.038 
-2.79** 
 
1.36 
1,931 
 
1,952 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Non-punitive Response to Errors and Number of Events Reported 
 
Hypothesis 18a stated that a non-punitive response to errors would be positively 
related to number of event reported by participants (see Table 25). The HLM analysis 
with the individual level data did not reveal a significant effect of a non-punitive response 
to events, F (1,1347) = .044, p = .833, nor a significant effect of group membership (p = 
.154). 
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Hypothesis 18b stated that willingness to report events partially mediates the 
relationship between non-punitive response to events and number of events reported (see 
Table 25). Using hospital management support as a covariate, a non-punitive response to 
errors is positively related to willingness to report events (F (1,964) = 62.62, p < .001). In 
other words, when there is less retribution for making an error, employees are more likely 
to report them. When testing the mediating relationship, Hypothesis 18b was not 
supported (non-punitive response to events: F (1,913) = 1.14, p = .285; willingness to 
report events: F (1,832) = .053, p = .818). 
 
Table 25 
HLM analysis predicting willingness to report errors as a mediating variable between 
non-punitive response to errors and number of events reported 
Model Predictor Criterion Estimate SE t df 
1 Non-punitive response to 
errors 
Hospital management 
support 
Number of 
events reported 
.05 
 
-.18 
.04 
 
.04 
1.42 
 
-4.95***
1,1413 
 
1,1398 
2 Non-punitive response to 
errors 
Hospital management 
support 
Willingness to 
report errors 
.23 
 
.29 
.04 
 
.04 
6.44***
 
7.91***
1,964 
 
1,964 
3 Willingness to report 
errors 
Number of 
events reported 
.02 .04 .527 1,738 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
DV: Incidents 
 
Hypotheses 1, 11, 14, 22, and 25, predicted relationships regarding incidents 
within units. Incidents are defined as the total number of incidents deemed reportable by 
the hospital in a 12 month period. Incidents include medication (e.g., wrong dosage of a 
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drug administered) and non-medication (e.g., wrong site surgery) type incidents. Because 
incident data is only available at the unit level, regression analysis was the method used 
to test these hypotheses. 
 
Supervisor Expectations about Safety and Incidents 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that supervisor expectations are negatively related to 
incidents (see Table 26). Using regression and controlling for hospital management 
support, this hypothesis was not supported, F (2,1437) = 2.05, p = .129. Additional 
analyses were run to determine if there was a relationship between supervisor 
expectations and incident type. Incidents were broken down into medication and non-
medication incidents, and covariate used to test the relationship (see Table 26). Contrary 
to expectations, supervisor expectations were positively related to medication incidents, 
indicating an increase in medication incidents in units with higher supervisor 
expectations, F (3,1436) = 68.41, p < .001. As would be expected, supervisor 
expectations were negatively related to non-medication incidents, F (3,1436) = 66.88, p < 
.001, although both of these relationships were weak. 
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Table 26 
Regression analysis testing the relationship between supervisor expectations about 
patient safety and incidents 
Model Predictor Criterion β R2 R2 ∆ p 
1 Supervisor expectations 
about patient safety 
Hospital management 
support 
Incidents .061* 
 
-.043 
 
.003 .003 .048 
2 Supervisor expectations 
about patient safety 
Hospital management 
support 
Non-medication 
incidents 
Medication 
incidents 
.118*** 
 
.009 
 
.340*** 
.125 .010 .000 
3 Supervisor expectations 
about patient safety 
Hospital management 
support 
Medication incidents 
Non-medication 
incidents 
-.068* 
 
-.062 
 
.341*** 
.123 .003 .020 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Hypothesis 11 stated that teamwork partially mediates the relationship between 
supervisor expectations and incidents. As previously discussed in Hypothesis 1, a 
relationship was not found between supervisor expectations and incidents. Exploratory 
analysis was conducted, however, to test the mediating relationship between supervisor 
expectations and incidents by type (medication and non-medication). Although the 
relationships were weak, medication incidents were positively related to supervisor 
expectations (contrary to expectations) and non-medication incidents were negatively 
related. Therefore, the test of mediation was continued to see if teamwork within units 
mediated either of these relationships (Hyp 14). First the relationship between teamwork 
within units was tested with medication and non-medication incidents. A positive 
relationship was found between teamwork within units and medication incidents (β = 
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.068. p < .05), whereas a negative relationship was found between teamwork and non-
medication incidents (β = -.117, p < .001). Next, the mediation was tested. When 
controlling for non-medication incidents, teamwork within units was shown to partially 
mediate the relationship between supervisor expectations about patient safety and 
medication incidents. However, when additional covariates were entered, this relationship 
was no longer supported. Likewise results were found for teamwork within units partially 
mediating the relationship between supervisor expectations and non-medication 
incidents. Further exploration identified perceptions of staffing to strongest contributor to 
the variance.  
As discussed in Hypothesis 1, supervisor expectations regarding safety were not 
related to incidents, however, further analysis revealed a relationship when incidents 
were broken down by type. Specifically a positive relationship was found with 
medication incidents whereas a negative relationship was found with non-medication 
incidents. Although Hypothesis 22 suggested that communication openness would 
mediate the relationship between supervisor expectations and incidents as a whole, the 
decision was made to test it as a mediating variable using medication and non-medication 
events. Because a positive relationship between supervisor expectations and 
communication openness had been previously established (Hyp 23), the first step was to 
test the relationship between communication openness and incidents by type. Using 
covariates, this relationship did not prove significant in either case (medication incidents: 
β = -.051, p = .058; non-medication incidents: β = .019, p = .486), and therefore, the 
mediating relationship was not further tested. 
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Hospital Management Support and Incidents 
 
Hypothesis 14 stated that teamwork partially mediates the relationship between 
hospital management support and incidents. To test this relationship, the first step was to 
test the direct relationship between hospital management support and incidents. 
Controlling for supervisor expectations about safety, sequential regression did not reveal 
a significant relationship (β = -.043, F (2,1437) = 2.05, p = .129). Although not 
hypothesized, additional analyses were run to identify a potential relationship between 
hospital management support and medication or non-medication incidents. No significant 
relationship was found between hospital management support and medication incidents, 
when controlling for supervisor expectations and non-medication incidents (β = .009, p = 
.745). As would be expected, a negative relationship was found between hospital 
management support and non-medication incidents, when controlling for supervisor 
expectations and medication incidents (F (1,1436) = 66.88, p < .001). Because only the 
relationship between teamwork within units and non-medication incidents was 
significant, this variable was used to test mediation. Using covariates, in step 2 of 
sequential regression the relationship between hospital management support and non-
medication errors was no longer significant (β = -.041, p = .163). Because of this, the test 
of mediation was not continued. 
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Table 27 
Regression analysis predicting a relationship between hospital management support for 
safety and incidents 
Model Predictor Criterion β R2 R2 ∆ p 
1 Hospital management 
support 
Supervisor expectations 
Incidents -.043 
.061 
.003 .001 .164 
2 Hospital management 
support 
Supervisor expectations 
Medication incidents 
Non-medication 
incidents 
-.062* 
-.068* 
.341***
.123 .003 .032 
3 Hospital management 
support 
Supervisor expectations 
Medication 
Communication openness 
Staffing 
Non-medication 
incidents 
-.029 
-.043 
.368*** 
.001 
-.108***
.132 .010 .163 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Hypothesis 25 stated that communication openness partially mediates the 
relationship between hospital management support and incidents (see Table 31). 
Although no relationship was found between hospital management support and incidents, 
a relationship was found between hospital management support and non-medication 
incidents (Hyp 14). Therefore, the test of mediation was continued. The relationship 
between communication and openness and non-medication incidents was tested using 
covariates. Sequential regression did not show a relationship (β = .022, p = .439) and 
therefore further testing of the mediation was discontinued. 
 
86 
 
Table 28 
Regression analysis predicting a relationship between communication openness and non-
medication incidents 
Model Predictor Criterion β R2 R2 ∆ p 
1 Communication openness 
Teamwork within units 
Teamwork across units 
Staffing 
Medication incidents 
Non-medication 
incidents 
.022 
-.117 
.030 
-.095 
.377 
.142 .142 .439 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
DV: Unit Reporting Rates 
 
Hypotheses 5a, 5b, 19a and 19b, predicted relationships surrounding the 
dependent variable ‘unit reporting rates’. Unit reporting rates are the percentage of events 
reported per unit per number of patient days. Because unit reporting rates are only 
available at the unit level, regression analysis was the method used to test these 
hypotheses. 
 
Hospital Management Support and Unit Reporting Rates 
 
Hypothesis 5a predicted that hospital management support and unit reporting rates 
would be positively related (see Table 32). Using non-punitive response to errors as a 
covariate, this hypothesis was supported, although the relationship was weak, R2 = .016, β 
= .045, F (2,1343) = 10.71, p < .001. Hypothesis 5b predicted that willingness to report 
events would partially mediate this relationship. Regression analysis revealed that 
hospital management support is positively related to willingness to report errors (R2 = 
.167, β = .281, F (2,966) = 97.13, p < .001) and willingness to report errors is positively 
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related to unit reporting rates (R2= .015, β = .124, F (1,910) = 14.11, p < .001). Finally, 
results showed that the partially mediating relationship was supported (hospital 
management support: β = .076, p < .05; willingness to report: β = .095, p < .01; R2= .020, 
F (2,909) = 9.42, p < .001). 
 
Table 29 
Regression analysis predicting willingness to report errors as a mediating variable 
between hospital management support for safety and unit reporting rates 
Model Predictor Criterion β R2 R2 ∆ p 
1 Hospital management 
support 
Non-punitive response to 
errors 
Willingness to 
report errors 
.281*** 
.212***
.167 .068 .001 
2 Hospital management 
support 
Non-punitive response to 
errors 
Unit reporting 
rates 
.089** 
.060* 
.016 .007 .001 
3 Willingness to report 
errors 
Unit reporting 
rates 
.124*** .015 .015 .001 
4 Hospital management 
support 
Willingness to report 
errors 
Unit reporting 
rates 
.076* 
.095** 
.020 .008 .007 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Non-punitive Response to Errors and Unit Reporting Rates 
 
Hypothesis 19a stated that a non-punitive response to errors will be positively 
related to unit reporting rates (see Table 33). When controlling for hospital management, 
results suggest that a non-punitive response to errors leads to higher unit reporting rates, 
thus supporting this hypothesis (R2= .016, F (2,1343) = 10.71, p < .001). Hypothesis 19b 
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predicted that willingness to report errors will partially mediate this relationship. This 
hypothesis was also supported (R2= .030, F (2,908) = 13.98, p < .001). 
 
Table 30 
Regression analysis predicting willingness to report errors as a mediating variable 
between non-punitive response to errors and unit reporting rates 
Model Predictor Criterion β R2 R2 ∆ p 
1 Non-punitive response to 
errors 
Hospital management 
support 
Unit reporting rates .060* 
 
.089** 
.016 .003 .040 
2 Non-punitive response to 
errors 
Hospital management 
support 
Willingness to 
report 
.212*** 
 
.281***
.167 .039 .001 
3 Willingness to report Unit reporting rates .124*** .015 .015 .001 
4 Non-punitive response to 
errors 
Willingness to report 
Unit reporting rates .127*** 
 
.084* 
.030 .006 .015 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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SECTION 5 - DISCUSSION 
 
Safety culture is a ‘buzz word’ that receives a lot of attention in high consequence 
environments. Research within aviation and beyond has examined what it takes to 
develop a positive safety culture—management support, promotion of a learning 
environment, documentation of errors, rewarding safe behaviors, among others. 
However, little research, especially in healthcare, has linked a positive safety culture to 
outcomes. Areas outside of healthcare have demonstrated that a positive safety culture 
leads to an increase in safe behaviors and a reduction and errors. Making this link is not 
an easy task—it requires a commitment from the organization to supply the resources 
necessary. The purpose of this research was to take a first look at linking perceptions of 
safety culture to patient safety outcomes within five critical care units—emergency 
department, surgery, intensive care, perinatal and pediatrics. Specifically, the AHRQ 
HSOPS was chosen as the measure for this dissertation which assesses both dimensions 
of safety culture as well as outcome variables. In addition, objective patient safety 
outcome data was also gathered (e.g., incidents, unit reporting rates) to better understand 
this relationship. Using high reliability theory as an organizing framework, a number of 
hypotheses were tested to uncover this seldom studied relationship. 
 
Sensitivity to Operations 
 
The first organizational value exhibited by HROs is sensitivity to operations, in 
which the purpose is to set the tone in the organization and its work units. This is 
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encouraged by supervisors who continuously monitor and discuss events as they occur as 
a means to promoting patient safety. As predicted, supervisor expectations regarding 
safety, hospital management support towards safety, explicit supervisor expectations 
about safety, and feedback and communication about errors are positively related to 
overall perceptions of safety and patient safety grade (i.e., Hyp 2, 3, 6, 7, 8a, 9a and 10). 
Previous research examining this link in the healthcare community was not found. 
However, these findings are consistent with research outside of healthcare which has 
shown that commitment from upper level management to safety and safe practices and 
feedback about errors lead to more positive attitudes (e.g., Cox et al., 1998; DePasquale 
& Geller, 1999; O’Toole, 2002; Zohar, 1980). Executive walkrounds, safety briefings, 
and safety training programs are suggestions for how management at all levels can show 
their commitment to safety. 
It was also hypothesized that this commitment from management would increase 
the number of events reported by employees and units (Hyp 3, 4a, 4b, 5a and 5b). A 
relationship was found between these predictor and criterion variables, however, 
employees response to the number of events that they reported in the last 12 months was 
in the opposite direction than predicted. Because the data also showed that employees are 
willing to report events when they occur, the likely explanation for these results is that 
management commitment to safety (i.e., support, explicit expectations, feedback about 
errors) leads to a safer environment and thus fewer errors to report. 
Likewise, organizational learning was shown to mediate the relationship between 
feedback and communication and overall perceptions of safety (Hyp 9a and 9b). This 
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indicates that when management provides feedback about errors that have occurred 
within a unit, employees perceive this as a willingness of the organization to learn from 
what happened rather than to cover it up. This further supports research that suggests that 
the cause of an error should be investigated (not just the outcome of the incident) and 
when its cause is determined, the whole organization should learn from it (Barling & 
Zacharatos, 1999). Discussing errors that have occurred without placing blame allows 
employees to learn from these errors and to avoid, trap, or mitigate the consequences of 
similar errors in the future before a serious incident occurs (Helmreich, Merritt, & 
Wilhelm, 1999; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998). 
Limited support was found for hypothesis 1 which predicted that supervisor 
expectations would be negatively related to incidents. In terms of overall incidents, no 
relationship was found between supervisor expectations and incidents. Further analysis of 
this relationship revealed contradictory results—medication incidents were positively 
related to supervisor expectations and non-medication incidents were negatively related 
(as would be expected), although this relationship was weak. Additional research is 
needed to understand why this may be the case. 
 
Reluctance to Simplify 
 
Teamwork on the front lines has been promoted in healthcare as a means to 
improving safety (e.g., Small, 1998). However, teamwork does not just happen; it must 
be promoted and supported by management albeit through training, team building or 
other means (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). The previous set of hypotheses discussed 
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indicated that a supportive environment by management leads to more positive 
perceptions of safety. Furthermore, hospital management support and supervisor 
expectations were positively related to teamwork, and teamwork is related to overall 
perceptions of safety and patient safety grade. However, overall the data to support the 
mediating relationship of teamwork within and across units was mixed (Hyp 11-16). 
Based on definitions of the constructs, teamwork within units served as the mediator for 
relationships involving supervisor expectations, and both teamwork within and across 
units were mediators for relationships involving hospital management support. For 
example, teamwork within units fully mediated (although only partial mediation was 
hypothesized) the relationship between supervisor expectations and non-medication 
incidents (Hyp 11), as well as hospital management support and non-medication incidents 
(Hyp 14) (teamwork across units was not significant). As predicted, teamwork within 
units partially mediated the relationship between supervisor expectations and patient 
safety grade (Hyp 13). Teamwork within units as a mediating variable between 
supervisor expectations and overall perceptions of safety was not supported (Hyp 12). 
Teamwork within units also did not serve as a mediating variable between hospital 
management support and overall perceptions of safety, although teamwork across units 
did (Hyp 15). Finally, both teamwork within units and teamwork across units served as 
mediators of the relationship between hospital management support and patient safety 
grade (Hyp 16). 
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Preoccupation with Failure 
 
HROs also demonstrate a preoccupation with failure in that, no matter how big or 
small, incidents that occur serve as a learning experience (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). To 
promote this, organizations encourage employees to report errors when they occur, 
without fear of retribution. Results of this research supported this, indicated by a 
significant, positive correlation between hospital management support for safety and a 
non-punitive response to errors (Hyp 17). Furthermore, support was found for the 
relationship between a non-punitive response to errors and unit reporting rates. 
Specifically, in units in which a non-punitive response to errors is perceived, there was 
also a higher number of errors reported (i.e., unit reporting rates), and employees 
willingness to report errors mediated this relationship, although the relationship was weak 
(Hyp 19a and 19b). Contrary to predictions, there was not a relationship between a non-
punitive response to errors and number of events reported by each employee (Hyp 18a 
and 18b). It may likely be the case that while employees are willing to report errors, the 
safe ‘environment’ in which they work mitigates the consequences of errors before they 
become a reportable incident. 
 
Commitment to Resilience 
 
HROs demonstrate a commitment to resilience by containing or managing 
unexpected events. This commitment is promoted in organizations by ensuring adequate 
resources, such as staffing levels, are available. Support was found for the importance of 
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staffing in that perceptions of staffing served as a mediating variable between hospital 
management support and overall perceptions of safety (Hyp 21). This indicates that 
hospital management's commitment to safety through adequate staffing levels has a 
positive impact on overall perceptions of safety. Furthermore, it was also predicted that 
staff turnover would be negatively correlated with perceptions of staffing, overall 
perceptions of safety and patient safety grade. Only partial support was found in that staff 
turnover was negatively correlated with overall perceptions of safety, suggesting that 
when staff turnover increases, overall perceptions of safety decrease. 
 
Deference to Expertise 
 
Deference to expertise is the fifth characteristic exhibited by HROs to contain, as 
well as identify, the unexpected. It has been suggested that good information flow 
between management and employees will lead to a more positive safety culture (Wilson-
Donnelly, Priest, Burke, & Salas, 2005). When employees feel that management is 
committed to safety, they will feel more comfortable communicating their ideas and 
opinions, and not hiding mistakes that are made. In addition, employees must feel 
comfortable asserting themselves to colleagues, an action sometimes discouraged in 
healthcare yet has a great impact on effective patient safety (e.g., Zwarenstein & Reeves, 
2002). Up until this point, positive relationships have been found between hospital 
management and supervisor support for safety and overall perceptions of safety and 
patient safety grade. In line with this, communication openness was predicted to partially 
mediate the relationship between supervisor expectations and overall perceptions of 
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safety. These hypotheses were supported indicating that a commitment from management 
to safety will lead to greater communication openness and subsequent higher perceptions 
of safety (Hyp 23, 24, 26, and 27). Contrary to predictions, communication openness did 
not partially mediate the relationship between management commitment and incidents as 
a whole, or when broken down by incident type (Hyp 22 and 25).  
 
Summary 
 
Given these findings, the question to be answered is “Does safety culture predict 
clinical outcomes?” The question may not be that easy however. Indeed, perceptions of 
management commitment to safety in work units do influence their overall perceptions of 
safety in that unit. Furthermore, this commitment from management results in the 
willingness of staff to report errors should they occur. In addition, providing feedback 
about errors that occur leads to higher perceptions of organizational learning, further 
encouraging the reporting of errors. However, the low number of incidents that occurred 
in the organization examined here made it difficult to link safety culture and incidents. 
Although weak, a relationship does seem to exist between perceptions of safety culture 
and reportable (i.e., to the state) non-medication type incidents. This research is just the 
tip of the iceberg. Additional research is needed to better understand this relationship. 
Research must also focus on those incidents that occur, yet don’t meet standards for 
reporting (i.e., near misses), as they may be more indicative as whether a relationship 
exists or not. 
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Limitations and Implications for Future Research 
 
Several limitations to this research should be noted. First, the data collected as a 
part of this research was primarily self-report. Given the sensitive nature of the data, it is 
possible that participants may have provided socially desirable responses to the survey. In 
other words, respondents may have provided more positive response to questions to give 
the impression of greater safety in their work units. 
Similarly, the generalizability of present findings may have been negatively 
impacted by the low response rate on the survey. Because of this, it is not possible to 
compare the respondents with non-respondents to determine if any systematic differences 
exist between these two groups. Low response rates are a common problem in 
organizational survey research, and some research suggests differences between 
respondents and non-respondents such as lower job satisfaction, greater intentions for 
turnover, and weaker organizational commitment (e.g., Rogelberg, Luong, Sederburg, & 
Cristol, 2000). Others research suggests that non-respondents are less conscientious and 
low agreeableness (Rogelberg, Conway, Sederburg, Spitzmüller, Aziz, & Knight, 2003). 
Similar conclusions may be identified in non-respondents to this research, for example, 
less willingness to report errors and lower perceptions of safety. As a consequence of low 
response, it is possible that the ranges of scores on some variables were restricted. Future 
research efforts should focus on expanding the respondent pool by encouraging all 
employees to participate as well as utilizing multiple methods (e.g., interviews, focus 
groups) to gather a more representative view of the organization’s safety culture. 
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A third weakness of this research focuses on the use of a single survey to collect 
much of the data. One of the concerns with this type of measure is that both predictor and 
criterion variables are collected using the same method, with the potential of mono-
method bias. However, given two of the dependent variables involve individual 
perceptions (i.e., patient safety grade and overall perceptions of safety). Therefore, it is 
not feasible to use another data source (e.g., supervisors’ perceptions of employees’ 
perceptions) to gather this data—it would not be reliable. Furthermore, while the 
dependent variables could have been collected at another point in time, a self-report 
measure of participant’s perceptions would still introduce the same concerns. To help 
alleviate these concerns, it has been suggested that some items on the measure be reverse 
worded and that items for predictor and criterion variables be intermixed (e.g., Cook & 
Campbell, 1977). The HSOPS demonstrates both of these suggestions. To also alleviate 
these concerns, several additional objective criterion variables were collected from 
different data sources to use as a part of this research. Research in the area of safety 
culture must continue to gather data from multiple sources to understand the true impact 
of safety culture on clinical outcomes. 
Finally, there are a number of difficulties for establishing a clear cause and effect 
between safety culture and incidents. After all, this data is difficult to collect—limited 
resources, fear of retribution, and low number of reportable incidents that occur in 
healthcare. As the results suggested, respondents are willing to report events when they 
occur, however, there appears to be limited opportunities to do so. Future research should 
consider investigating the link between safety culture perceptions and near-miss 
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incidents. The healthcare community is beginning to recognize the importance of near-
miss incidents and the Veteran’s Affairs (VA) and NASA have teamed up to develop the 
Patient Safety Reporting System (PSRS) (www.psrs.arc.nasa.gov). Currently this system 
is only available to VA hospital employees. However, some hospitals utilize internal 
systems to track near-misses and these incidents need to studied.  
  
Practical Implications 
 
This study is useful in directing attention to the understudied relationship between 
safety culture and clinical outcomes. The findings support previous research in that 
hospital management and supervisor support for safety does improve overall perceptions 
of safety. This research extended the literature by investigating the link between safety 
culture perceptions and objective outcomes—incidents.  
Several hypotheses investigated as a part of this research examined the 
relationship between perceptions of safety culture and incidents. The results suggest that 
when incidents are looked at as a whole (i.e., all incidents which occurred within a unit), 
no relationship existed. However, when incidents were broken down by type, namely 
medication versus non-medication errors, interesting results were found. In fact, a more 
positive safety culture was linked to an increase in medication type incidents. These 
results initially seem counterintuitive. To suggest a positive relationship between safety 
culture and medication incidents on the surface detracts from the research in other 
domains suggesting the opposite. It could be the case that an increase in incidents leads 
an organization to implement additional patient safety efforts, and therefore employees 
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perceive a more positive safety culture. Additional research is needed to investigate this, 
as well as the impact of a positive safety culture on other types of incidents. For example, 
it remains to be seen whether a positive safety culture has a different impact on severe 
(i.e., life threatening) versus non-severe incidents.  
In line with the above, it can not be concluded that when an incident occurs, that 
learning actually takes place. The data suggests that management that supports a safety 
culture provides feedback regarding incidents that occur, and thus employees perceive 
organizational learning. However, does this communication about incidents actually lead 
to behavioral change? For example, Desai and colleagues (2006) examined accidents in 
aviation and found that better learning occurred from accidents of moderate severity. The 
reason suggested is that these incidents were salient enough that they prompted 
improvement without being overly complex in which recovery efforts would face 
challenges. Organizations need to understand which incidents will have the greatest 
impact on learning. Therefore, future research needs to examine the short term and long 
term effects of incidents and other patient safety initiatives. 
This research also has implications for safety-related behaviors. The findings 
suggest that in environments in which employees perceive a positive safety culture, they 
are also more willing to report incidents when they occur. It is likely that the positive 
perceptions of safety culture will translate in to other positive safe behaviors such as 
monitoring of team members performance, less risk taking behavior, and asking for help 
when overloaded, among others. Additional research should seek to uncover how a 
positive safety culture impacts these and other safe behaviors in the workplace.  
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Finally, this research used high reliability theory as a framework. While a direct 
cause and effect relationship can not be made between the organizational values posited 
by HRT (e.g., organizations promoting sensitivity to operations leads to improved patient 
safety), there is reason to believe that there is a link. There is notably a relationship 
between hospital employees’ perceptions of an organization's commitment to these 
values and outcomes. Future research should examine the link between these values at the 
organizational level (i.e., patient safety activities in place to support them), safety culture 
and clinical outcomes. 
In conclusion, it is difficult to say whether positive perceptions of safety culture 
lead to improved patient safety or vice versa. It is the circular cause and consequence as 
faced in the dilemma “which came first, the chicken or the egg?” A valid argument could 
be made for both. However, the research presented here indicates that there is in fact a 
relationship, and provides a first look at this seldom studied relationship. With this 
information, it is hoped that organizations will be better prepared to address specific areas 
of safety culture that may be contributing to poor patient safety, and thus, improve it in 
the future. 
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APPENDIX A 
SUMMARY OF SAFETY CULTURE LITERATURE 
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Table A.1 
Empirical literature examining safety culture/climate in organizations 
Source Domain Key findings 
Armstrong & 
Laschinger 
(2006) 
Healthcare 
(40 healthcare 
workers at a Magnet 
hospital) 
 Total empowerment significantly positively 
related to perceptions of patient safety culture. 
 Patient safety climate most strongly related to 
access to support (feedback), informal power 
(strong alliances), and opportunity to learn 
and grow (continuous learning). 
 Structural empowerment and Magnet hospital 
characteristics together are a significant 
predictor of staff nurses’ perceptions of 
patient safety climate. 
Brown & 
Holmes (1986) 
Production workers 
in 10 manufacturing 
companies (n= 425, 
of those 200 had 
suffered an accident 
in the past year and 
225 had not) 
 Three-factor safety climate: risk, management 
concern, and management action found to be 
a better fit than Zohar’s (1980) 8-factor 
model. 
 Post-traumatic group’s perceptions of risk, 
management concerns, and management 
actions were significantly lower than pre-
traumatic group. 
Brown, Willis, 
& Prussia 
(2000) 
Steel industry (n= 
551 workforce, 
69%)Soft drink 
bottling factory (n= 
97 employees) 
 Safety climate was negatively related to 
supervisory pressure. 
 Knowledge and motivation predict 
compliance and participation. 
 Relationship between knowledge and 
compliance is stronger than that of knowledge 
and participation. 
 Safety climate influences knowledge and 
motivation. 
 Safety climate influences participation. 
 Relationship between organizational climate 
and safety performance is mediated by safety 
climate, knowledge, and motivation. 
Burns, Mearns, 
& McGeorge 
(2006) 
UK gas plant  Authors looked at trust as a factor related to 
safety culture. 
 On explicit measures, employees trusted their 
coworkers, supervisors and plant managers. 
 When implicit measures were used, trust was 
only found for coworkers. 
 The authors consider that trust and distrust 
may be different constructs. 
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Source Domain Key findings 
Carroll (1998) Nuclear power plant 
(n= 130) 
 The results of the safety culture survey and 
group interviews were fed back to 
management as part of the culture 
improvement process. 
 Results showed that management behaviors 
were too hierarchical and the role of the 
supervisor was under minded, despite the 
findings of a healthy culture. 
 Employees were worried about being blamed 
for mistakes and there was a lack of positive 
reinforcement for safety behaviors. 
Castle (2006); 
Castle, 
Handler, 
Engberg, & 
Sonon (2007) 
Healthcare 
(n= 1579 nurse aides 
at 72 nursing homes) 
 Patient safety culture ratings at nursing homes 
were significantly lower than benchmark 
ratings at a hospital setting. 
 In facilities with higher registered nurse 
staffing levels, higher safety culture scores 
were given. 
Catchpole et al. 
(2006) 
Healthcare 
(24 paediatric cardiac 
cases) 
 366 failures recorded. 
 Cultural and organizational threats were most 
frequently encountered single type of threat 
(associated with 85 or 23% of failures). 
 Task threats (33 or 9% of failures) often 
appeared in combination with patient (87 or 
24%) and environmental (19 or 5%) threats. 
 Patient threats always appeared with task 
threats. 
 Environmental threats accounted for 54 or 
15% of failures and another 12 or 3% of 
failures when combined with environmental 
and cultural/organizational threats. 
Cheyne et al. 
(1998) 
Multinational 
manufacturing (n= 
915) 
 Employee attitudes to management directly 
influenced safety activities and indirectly 
influence individual responsibilities for 
safety. 
Cheyne et al. 
(1999) 
Manufacturing, dairy 
produce, transport, 
workforce (n= 2429) 
 Appraisals of commitment were strongly 
predicted by management actions and 
responsibility and less strongly predicted by 
quality of safety training in all samples. 
 There was also a strong reciprocal 
relationship between these predictors. 
 Attitudes to management actions were related 
to personal actions and responsibility in 
manufacturing and dairy produce, but not in 
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Source Domain Key findings 
transport. 
 There was a weak but significant negative 
relationship between training and personal 
actions and responsibility across all 3 samples 
 Evidence that the architecture of safety 
climate was not stable across industries. 
Clarke (1999) Train operating 
companies (train 
drivers: n= 186; 
supervisors: n= 55; 
senior managers: n= 
71) 
 A novel method was used to examine the 
degree of shared perceptions of culture 
between workers, supervisors, and managers. 
 Each level was aware that shared safety 
priorities did not exist. 
 In-group perceptions were not always 
accurate and were sometimes biased. 
 There was partial support that workers base 
their perceptions of senior managers on their 
perceptions of local management and 
supervisors. 
Cox & Cox 
(1991) 
Gas company depots 
(n= 630) 
 Based on the factor analysis and framework 
suggested by Purdham (1984, as cited in Cox 
and Cox, 1991), a theoretical model 
emphasizing the shared aspects of employee 
attitudes to safety is presented. 
Cox et al. 
(1998) 
13 manufacturing 
companies (n= 3329) 
 Managers, supervisors, and temporary 
workers had generally lower perceptions than 
permanent workers. 
 Management actions for safety were the 
strongest predictor of employee appraisals of 
organizational safety, followed by training 
and personal actions. 
 SEM analysis found that personal actions 
emerged as stronger predictors than training, 
although there is a strong reciprocal 
relationship between them. 
 Management actions were the only predictor 
of personal actions. 
Cox, Jones, & 
Collinson 
(2006) 
Nuclear and Offshore 
oil 
(2 case studies) 
 In nuclear case, trust was critical in the 
development and sustainability of a safety 
culture based upon error reporting, individual 
and organizational learning, and perceived 
need for a ‘just’ culture. 
 Individuals encouraged to take responsibility 
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Source Domain Key findings 
for safety within the organization and to 
develop a question and challenge culture. 
 In offshore oil case, low levels of trust 
negatively impacted safety culture through 
poor cooperation and communication among 
employees and managers. 
 Low trust reinforced a culture of blame and 
non-reporting of safety-related information. 
Coyle et al. 
(1995) 
Clerical and service 
organizations (n= 
880) 
 Safety climate factors were not stable across 
organizations. 
 Glennon’s (1982, as cited in Coyle et al., 
1995) findings that nine factors would be 
universal was not supported since the factors 
structures of organization 1 did not match 
organization 2. 
 Results also did not support Brown and 
Holmes’ (1986) universal 3 factors. 
Dedobbeleer & 
Beland (1991) 
9 construction 
companies (n= 384) 
 Attempts to validate previous research by 
Zohar (1980); Brown and Holmes (1986). 
 Brown and Holmes 3-factor model was 
supported by the data but a new 2-factor 
model proved an even better fit. 
 The 2 factors of management commitment 
and workers involvement were correlated .61. 
 The questionnaire only comprised nine 
questions, roughly one question to represent 
each factor from Zohar’s solution. 
DeJoy, 
Schaffer, 
Wilson, 
Vandenberg, & 
Butts (2004) 
Retail 
(n= 2208 employees 
at 21 retail units) 
 Negative relationship between environmental 
exposures (heat, noise, lighting) and safety 
climate. 
 Safety policies and programs positively and 
significantly contributed to safety climate. 
 Organizational climate factors (e.g., 
communication, involvement) had a 
significant positive relationship with safety 
climate. 
 Environmental exposure, safety policies and 
programs, organizational support, and 
participation-others were each significantly 
related to safety at work. 
 Environmental exposures, safety policies and 
programs, organizational support, coworker 
support, and communication were each 
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Source Domain Key findings 
significant predictors of safety climate. 
 Safety climate is not a mediator between 
participation-others and safety at work. 
 Environmental conditions, safety policies and 
programs, and organizational climate 
accounted for 55% of the variance in safety 
climate. 
Demiris, 
Patrick & 
Boren (2004) 
Healthcare 
(n= 16 administrators 
and 14 health car 
providers from 6 
rural hospitals in 
Missouri) 
 3 administrators versus 13 healthcare 
providers agreed that there was a timely 
response to adverse event reports. 
 8 of 16 administrators stated that the current 
mechanism for event reporting is appropriate 
and adequate for ensuring patient safety. Only 
3 of 14 healthcare providers agreed. 
 12 of 16 administrators and 13 of 14 
healthcare providers agreed that events are 
under reported. 
 10 of 14 healthcare providers believed there 
was no culture of blame that was regularly 
placed on individuals involved in medical 
errors. 
DePasquale & 
Geller (1999) 
20 industrial sites 
implementing 
behavior-based safety 
programs (BBS) 
 Factors determined to be critical to BBS 
success. 
 Allow time for employees to get used to being 
observed and receiving feedback. 
 Trainers must be clear that program is not a 
place to blame or criticize others. 
 Interpersonal trust is important. 
 Continued support from management is 
essential. 
 Employee involvement in training is 
necessary. 
 Trust in management’s ability to facilitate and 
support BBS is important. 
 Steering committee must be in touch with 
what employees need to improve safety. 
 Other findings: 
 Mandatory BBS programs vs. voluntary 
programs use more positive feedback. 
 Mandatory vs. voluntary demonstrate greater 
levels of trust in management and coworkers. 
 Increased employee involvement leads to 
more trust and vice versa. 
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Source Domain Key findings 
 Greater experience with observation and 
feedback leads to more trust. 
Desai, Roberts, 
& Ciavarelli 
(2006) 
US Naval flight 
squadrons (6361 
pilots, flight officers, 
and other aircrew in 
147 squadrons) 
 Minor or intermediately severe accidents were 
positively related with future safety climate 
scores. 
 No effect was found for severe accidents. 
Diaz & 
Cabrera (1997) 
Aviation 
(166 airport 
personnel from 3 
companies) 
 Overall, safety climate appears to be related 
to general safety levels. 
 Organizations with higher safety levels had 
higher safety climate scores and more positive 
safety attitudes. 
 Organizational policies and practices are 
related to workers’ global perceptions and 
safety climate. 
 Likely that safety policies impact behaviors. 
 Significantly significant relationship between 
safety attitudes and safety climate. 
 Attitudes appear to be better predictor of 
climate than climate of attitudes. 
 Employees perceptions regarding the 
importance given towards organizational 
philosophy is critical for productivity and 
safety. 
 Specific findings: 
 Ramp workers had significantly lower 
positive attitudes than non-ramp workers. 
 Significant differences found between 
companies regarding safety factors. 
Donald & 
Canter (1994) 
10 chemical sites (n= 
701) 
 Strong relationship between safety climate 
and self-reported accidents. 
 Correlations ranged from -.45 to -.83, p < .05. 
 Attitudes toward safety reports were the only 
item not to correlate with self-reported 
accidents. 
Forgaty & 
Shaw (2003) 
Aircraft maintenance  Examined the relationship between safety 
climate and violation behaviors. 
 Management attitudes and group norms found 
to be predictors of violation behavior. 
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Source Domain Key findings 
Gaba, Singer, 
Sinaiko, 
Bowen, & 
Ciavarelli 
(2003) 
Naval aviation and 
healthcare 
 Significant differences found between 
aviators and healthcare providers. 
 Level of problematic response 12 times 
greater for hospital workers than aviators. 
Galvan, Bacha, 
Mohr, & 
Barach (2005) 
Healthcare 
(all pediatric cardiac 
surgery team 
members) 
 Preliminary results from the safety survey 
suggest a lack of awareness to patient safety 
hazard as well as lack of awareness of the 
various ways to keep children from being 
harmed in the OR. 
Garavan & 
O’Brien (2001) 
Manufacturing 
(n= 1240 employees 
in 25 companies) 
 Gender does not appear to have a significant 
effect on safety climate overall. Gender did 
have a significant effect on extent to which 
employees are likely to perceive that safety 
climate promotes ownership of and 
participation in safety issues, particular 
beliefs about people who have accidents, and 
strict adherence to rules and procedures; level 
of management commitment to safety; degree 
of riskiness in the job. 
 Participation in safety training does not 
appear to have a significant effect on 
employees’ perception of overall safety 
climate in the organization, but did have a 
significant effect on extent to which 
employees perceive that safety climate 
promotes ownership of and participation in 
safety issues, extent to which climate contains 
negative stereotypes about safety conscious 
employees, beliefs about people who typically 
have accidents, and perception of 
management commitment to health and 
safety. 
 Job title had a significant effect on 
perceptions of overall safety climate, 
perceptions of ownership of and participation 
in safety, perceived riskiness of the job, 
perception of the existence of specific 
strategies for safety, beliefs regarding the 
extent of proactive approaches to safety, 
perception that management has sole 
ownership of safety, and perception of strict 
adherence to rules. 
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Source Domain Key findings 
 Age had a significant effect on extent of 
negative stereotypes about safety conscious 
employees, perceptions of proactive 
approaches to safety, and extent of 
perceptions of management commitment to 
safety. 
 Organizational tenure had a significant effect 
on extent of negative stereotypes about safety 
conscious employees and level of riskiness in 
the job. 
 Accident history had a significant effect on 
perceptions of management commitment to 
safety, perceived riskiness of the job, and 
perceived extent of strict adherence to roles 
for those who engage in unsafe work 
behavior. 
 For employees involved in a near accident in 
last 12 months, this had a significant effect on 
perception of management commitment to 
safety, perceived riskiness on the job, beliefs 
about accident proneness, individual 
perceptions that specific strategies exist for 
safety, perception that management has sole 
ownership of safety and belief that employees 
possess the capacity to be safety conscious. 
 Participation in safety training had a 
significant effect on stereotyping, ownership 
and participation in safety, beliefs about 
people who typically have accidents and 
perception of management commitment to 
safety. 
 Age was significant in relation to engagement 
in preventative safety behaviors and 
communication of unsafe work conditions, as 
well as breaking safety rules (a negative 
behavior). 
 Organizational tenure had a significant effect 
on communication of unsafe work conditions 
and engagement in risky behavior. 
 Gender was significant in relation to attention 
to rules and procedures, good housekeeping 
practice, and engaging in preventative safety 
behavior. 
110 
 
Source Domain Key findings 
 Job title was significant in relation to positive 
response to hazardous situations, 
communication of unsafe work conditions, 
proper use of equipment, engagement in 
preventative safety behavior, good 
housekeeping practices, and attention to rules 
and procedures.  
 Participation in safety training had a 
significant effect on safety behaviors 
(communication, preventive safety behavior, 
and attention to rules and procedures). 
 Management commitment to safety was 
positively and significantly correlated with 
safe behaviors and negatively correlated with 
unsafe behaviors. 
 Overall, when employees have more positive 
perceptions of safety climate, they are less 
likely to engage in unsafe behaviors. 
Garnerin, 
Huchet-
Belouard, 
Diby, & 
Clergue (2006) 
Healthcare 
(case study) 
 Used a multidisciplinary system analysis to 
identify care-delivery problems and 
contributory factors. 
 3 care-delivery problems were identified: 
patient equipped with wrong pump when 
transferred from ICU to surgical ward, error 
made when substituting pumps in order to 
continue treatment, and replacement of 
incorrect pump was delayed. 
 Corrective actions: increase number of 
necessary pumps within units, train nurses on 
appropriate knowledge to administer pumps, 
clarified medical responsibilities to avoid 
delays. 
Glendon & 
Litherland 
(2001) 
Road construction  No relationship found between safety climate 
and behaviors. 
 Some safety climate factors may be stable 
across organizations and industries (adequacy 
of procedures, work pressure, personal 
protective equipment, relationships, and 
safety rules). 
Griffin & Neal 
(2000) 
Manufacturing and 
mining organizations 
(study 1: n= 1264 
employees; study 2: 
 Study 1: Safety climate showed a direct and 
positive relationship with both safety 
compliance and safety participation. 
 Results suggest a difference between safety 
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n= 326 employees) compliance (e.g., uses protective equipment) 
and safety participation (e.g., participates in 
safety requirements development). 
 Study 2 (authors suggest further investigation 
of these results): Safety climate is likely to 
influence safety participation through safety 
knowledge and participation motivation. 
 Compliance motivation is negatively related 
to safety participation. 
Harvey et al. 
(2001) 
Nuclear 
(Pre safety training: 
n= 417; post safety 
training: n= 480) 
 Managers’ scores were significantly higher 
than shop floor employees at T1 and T2 in 
terms of perceived management style and 
communication, responsibility, commitment 
and involvement, job satisfaction, and risk 
awareness. 
 Managers’ scores increased on 5 of 6 factors 
between T1 and T2 but were only significant 
on perceived management style and 
communication and complacency. 
 Shop floor employees only showed a 
significant change on job satisfaction between 
T1 and T2 and this was in the negative 
direction. 
Harvey et al. 
(2002) 
Nuclear 
(n= 1003 employees 
at 2 plants) 
 Safety culture differs between shop floor and 
management employees. 
 Overall, shop floor employees viewed 
management communication, management 
commitment to safety, personal responsibility 
for safety and being listened to, more 
negatively than management employees. 
 Shop floor employees at Plant A viewed 
management and greater risk awareness and 
risk taking more positively than management. 
 Shop floor employees at Plant B had more 
negative views regarding management and 
lower job satisfaction than management. 
 Job satisfaction appeared to have greatest 
impact on perceptions of safety. 
Hignett & 
Crumpton 
(2007) 
Healthcare 
(n= 64 nurses, 4 from 
16 organization) 
 Safety culture scores ranged from 17-77% 
(average of 47%) (i.e., % compliance with 
RCN competencies). 
 For the sitting-to-standing task, 32 
participants from organizations with an 
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average score of 51% chose to use the 
handling belt/sling, which has the lower 
postural risk (REBA= 3.4) than others. 
 The average organizational score of 
participants choosing the manual technique, 
which has greater postural risk (REBA= 7.4), 
was 39%. The manual technique is only 20 
secs faster than belt. 
 Participants who chose the manual technique 
made fewer decisions and showed less 
evidence of problem solving than those who 
chose the handling belt/sling. 
 For the repositioning-in-sitting task, 
participants from higher scoring organizations 
(56% compliance) chose the hoist, mid-
scoring organizations (47%) chose the belt or 
manual techniques, and low scoring (33%) 
chose slide sheets. Hoist is the recommended 
method whereas manual is not accepted 
unless patient can take most of their weight. 
 Overall results indicated in organizations with 
more positive safety culture, nurses 
demonstrated more complex decision making 
about patient handling and had lower levels of 
postural risk. 
Hofmann & 
Mark (2006) 
Healthcare (1127 
nurses in 81 medical-
surgical units in 42 
hospitals) 
 Overall safety climate was significantly 
related to medication errors, urinary tract 
infections, nurse back injuries, patient 
satisfaction, patient perceptions of nurse 
responsiveness, and nurse satisfaction. 
Hofmann & 
Stetzer (1996) 
 
Chemical processing 
(sample 21 teams and 
222 individuals) 
  
 Role overload, group processes, safety 
climate, and intentions to approach were 
related to unsafe behaviours.  
 Intentions to approach mediated the 
relationship between group processes and 
unsafe behaviours.  
 At the group level, safety climate, group 
processes, intentions to approach, and unsafe 
behaviors were related to OSHA recordable 
accidents. 
Hofmann & 
Stetzer (1998) 
Utility company 
(sample 1: 1520 
workers and 
 Supervisors made more internal attributions to 
accidents than workers. 
 Groups in which safety information was 
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supervisors; sample 
2: 735 workers and 
supervisors) 
openly communicated are more likely to 
make internal casual attributions when the 
worker was implicated by the evidence. 
 Groups in which safety information was not 
openly communicated showed a restriction of 
information flow. 
 Safety climate did not moderate the 
relationship between informational cues 
received and attributions made. 
Huang (2007) Healthcare (n= 4 ICU 
units) 
 Nurses had lower scores on the SAQ when 
compared to physicians. However, across the 
board, scores were low on all six patient 
safety factors. 
Hughes & 
Lapane (2006) 
Healthcare 
(n= 367 nurses and 
636 nursing 
assistants) 
 Only 11% of nurses and 13% of nursing 
assistants gave excellent safety grades for 
their facility; 5% of both groups gave a 
failing/poor grade. 
 Length of employment (less or more than 1 
year) did not have a significant impact on 
safety ratings. However, those employed for 
more than 1 year were more likely to report 
that staff worked as a team and units 
cooperated well. 
 Third shift employees were least likely to give 
their department an overall very good or 
acceptable grade. 
 More nursing assistants (25% vs. 18%) 
indicated that reporting a safety incident 
seems like the person is being written up 
rather than the problem. More nurses (42% 
vs. 36%), however, indicate that the reporting 
of errors of another staff member was seen as 
a personal attack against them. 
Jarvinen & 
Karwowski 
(1995) 
Manufacturing 
(Advanced 
Manufacturing 
Systems) 
 Individual involved (operator-67%; 
maintenance/ repair-20%; laborer-8%). 
 Activity at time of accident (clearing 
blockage-18%; loading/unloading-16%; fault 
finding-15%; making adjustments-13%). 
 Type of accident (pinch-point-75%; impact-
19%; other-6%). 
 Operating mode (automatic-55%; manual-
19%; stopped, not isolated-16%). 
 Automated equipment movement 
114 
 
Source Domain Key findings 
(programmed or normal-57%; unexpected-
24%; sensor inadvertently activated-12%). 
 Equipment safeguarding (safeguard defeated-
25%; allowed access to hazard zone-22%; no 
or inadequate interlock-17%; no guard-16%; 
guard removed-11%). 
 Factors identified as relating to accidents 
(improper procedures followed-44%; human 
error-38%; incompatible workplace layout-
27%; incompatible controls-25%; lack of 
awareness-20%; inadequate training-16%). 
Jeffcott, 
Pidgeon, 
Weyman, & 
Walls (2006) 
Railway 
(N= 500+ staff and 
40 senior staff) 
 Since the 1993 privatization and 
organizational restructuring of the UK railway 
industry, there have been important 
repercussions for safety culture and trust 
relationships. 
 Fragmentation has led to potential for 
tensions to develop across various 
organizational interfaces. 
 Performance regime has led to an increased 
focus on performance and attribution of 
blame for underperformance has emerged. 
 Proceduralization was primarily motivated by 
self-preservation within a culture focused on 
accountability. 
 The principles of career advancement based 
upon tenure and long established 
apprenticeship system have been replaced 
with targeted recruitment, higher turnover of 
staff, and classroom-based learning. Concern 
over the loss of conceptual understandings of 
railway rules, procedures and operating 
practices in new, nonrail recruits. 
 Accidents have formed a crucial determinant 
of attitudes, relationships, and culture 
throughout the sector. Led to a risk-based 
approach in favor of an overcautious one, 
allowing risk aversion to dominate decision 
making. There is also a fear of prosecution 
which has pressured staff to maintain 
exemplary levels of competence. 
 Over reliance on formal procedures and audits 
of performance are felt to only foster and 
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create distrust. 
 Overall, train operating companies appear 
more rigid rather than flexible, have 
deficiencies relating to perceptions of 
management commitment, and lack of 
consistently open/ communicative 
environment to foster learning. 
 Positives of privatization: improved training, 
improved working relationships (formal and 
informal), attempt to realign operating 
companies’ goals with overall infrastructure 
management. 
Jiang & Gainer 
(1987) 
Organizations using 
robots 
 Individual involved (operator-72%; 
maintenance-9%; programmers-9%). 
 Type of accident (pinch-point-56%; impact-
44%). 
 Factors relating to cause of accidents (human 
error-41%; inappropriate/poor workplace 
design-63%; robot design-22%). 
 Overall findings: largest causal factor of 
accidents was inadequate, poor, or non-
existent methods to safeguard employees. 
Katz-Navon, 
Naveh, & Stern 
(2005) 
Healthcare (n= 632 
providers in 47 
hospital untis) 
 Study found that the priority of safety 
moderated the curvilinear relationship 
between safety procedures and the number of 
a unit’s treatment errors, and the linear 
relationship between managerial safety 
practices and the number of a unit’s treatment 
errors. 
 When safety was a high rather than low 
priority, there were fewer treatment errors 
when procedures were perceived as either 
insufficient or overly detailed. 
Lee & Harrison 
(2000) 
Nuclear 
(n= 70+ staff and 
managers) 
 Younger workers’ positive attitudes were 
attributed to less time on the job and begin on 
a positive note, and older workers have the 
most positive attitudes which was correlated 
with higher level staff positions. Most 
negative attitudes found in the 30-40 age 
range. 
 Age had a significant influence for some job 
types in terms of job satisfaction, perceived 
empowerment, organizational risk level, 
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satisfaction with contractor safety, and respect 
for contractors’ role. 
 Women had more positive attitudes towards 
safety than men, significant on 19 attitudinal 
variables. Women were significantly more 
negative in terms of personal risk than men. 
Women and office workers, however, don’t 
typically work in high hazard areas. 
 Shift workers were almost uniformly more 
negative than day workers, significant on 23 
of 28 factors. Shift workers were significantly 
more positive (cautious) regarding personal 
risk than day workers. Shift workers are less 
prone to personal stress but report lower 
satisfaction with job relationships. Shift 
workers less confident in the organizational 
risk level and safety standards. 
 Senior managers are reported to put the most 
pressure on employees and colleagues and 
safety reps are seen as most likely source of 
suggestions to improve safety. 
 Safety attitudes were highly correlated with 
attention given to safety in team briefings and 
management style. 
Lee (1998) Nuclear reprocessing 
plant (n= 5296) 
 Most factors identified discriminated between 
accident and non-accident groups. 
 Nineteen factors were identified: 
 1 factor: safety procedures 
 3 factors: risks 
 3 factors: permit to work 
 4 factors: job satisfaction 
 2 factors: safety rules 
 1 factor: participation 
 2 factors: training 
 2 factors: control 
 1 factor: design  
Lymer, Richt, 
& Isaksson 
(2004) 
Healthcare 
(n= 9 nurses and 6 
nursing assistants) 
 When discussing things contributing to good 
safety culture, healthcare workers commonly 
referred to: people, type of work, equipment 
and events. 
 In wards where patients with blood-borne 
pathogens are frequently treated, a more 
rigorous safety climate developed compared 
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to other wards. Workers are constantly aware 
that they are at risk. 
 When there are many patients to take care of, 
safe work practices are sacrificed to get the 
job done. Reasons cited include less time to 
prepare for a task and use of protective 
equipment takes time away from next task 
and next patient. 
 2/3 of participants had experienced a blood-
exposure incident and almost all knew of 
someone who had. From those, only 2 
reported the incident and took appropriate 
infection avoidance procedures although it is 
required. 
 Poor reporting was related to a will to sustain 
a positive self-image (don’t want to be 
considered ‘clumsy’ or ‘unprofessional’), 
complicated reporting instruments, and filing 
papers is not considered their main task, 
especially when time is sparse. 
 Socialization into infection control, 
routinization, stereotyping, perception of 
patient wishes, presence of competing values 
and norms, and a will of workers to solve 
dilemmas were reported to undermine 
compliant behavior and safety culture. 
Makary et al. 
(2006) 
Healthcare 
(n= 2135 surgical 
providers—surgeons, 
OR nurses, surgical 
technicians, 
anesthesiologists, 
CRNAs—from 60 
hospitals) 
 Safety climate varied widely by hospital, but 
not provider type. 
 Safety climate scores in each hospital ranged 
from 16.3% to 100% positive. 
 6 of 7 safety climate items did not show 
significant differences across provider type. 
OR nurses were significantly less positive 
about one item “I would feel safe being 
treated here as a patient” than surgeons and 
anesthesiologists. 
McCarthy & 
Blumenthal 
(2006) 
Healthcare 
(n= 6 case studies) 
 Sentara Norfolk General Hospital: baseline 
assessment suggested 4 strategies to promote 
safety-related behaviors: behavior-based 
expectations, establishment of high priority 
rules, conducting timely and rigorous ‘root 
cause analysis’, and simplifying policies and 
procedures. 
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 Preliminary results indicate a 42% increase in 
use of expected communications behaviors, 
84% reduction in ventilator-associated 
pneumonias and 63% decrease in the rate of 
device-associated bloodstream infections. 
 US Department of Veterans Affairs: main 
components of safety program are: 
establishing a non-punitive and confidential 
approach to unintended error reporting, 
encouraging reporting of adverse events and 
close calls, training on easy to use computer 
aided root cause analysis tools and cognitive 
aids to analyze reported events, adapting a 
systems engineering tool to uncover system 
vulnerabilities and design and assess 
improvements, and disseminating warnings 
about threats and lessons learned. 
 Results indicate nearly all root cause analyses 
have been able to recommend a solution, 
100% increase in perceived preventability of 
events, shift in patient behavior and 
professional training to HF and systems 
issues. 
 Kaiser Permanente: principle interventions 
were: multidisciplinary patient rounds, 
assertive and structured communication 
techniques, communication escalation policy, 
and team briefings before procedures and 
debriefings after. 
 After preoperative briefings instituted, no 
wrong-site surgeries reported. Other reported 
error management behaviors increased, such 
as willingness to speak up about safety 
concerns and report and discuss mistakes, 
suggesting better situational awareness.  
 Comparing safety attitudes scores, OR staff 
perceived improvement in safety culture and 
teamwork. 
 Nurse turnover rate fell by 2/3. 
 1 year after safety program instituted, labor 
and delivery staff in all four perinatal sites 
rated safety culture more highly than before. 
 Missouri Baptist Medical Center: instituted 
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rapid response teams. 
 After 2 months of full implementation, calls 
for rapid response teams increased to 70-80% 
per month, 60% decrease in emergency calls 
for respiratory arrest and similar crises, and 
15% decrease in cardiac arrests, suggesting 
acute crises being averted by early 
intervention. 
 Johns Hopkins Hospital: instituted the 
Comprehensive Unit-based Safety Program 
(CUSP), educating about evidenced-based 
infection control practices and completing a 
posttest, supply catheter insertion carts with 
standardized supplies, follow checklist for 
safety catheter insertion, empower nurses to 
intervene, and prompt ICU team on daily 
goals sheet to ask physicians if catheters can 
be removed. 
 Daily goals sheet led to an increased self-
reported understanding of goals of care from 
10% to 95%. Following implementation of 
CUSP, average ICU length of stay fell by 1-2 
days. After senior executives’ involvement, 
documented catheter-related bloodstream 
infections were eliminated, preventing an 
estimated 43 infections and 8 deaths and 
saving an estimated $2 million. 
 OSF St. Joseph Medical Center: to reduce 
errors, interviewed nurses to obtain 
information regarding home medication use, 
when patients transferred or discharged, 
existing medications compared with those 
ordered by physician to be continued, any 
discrepancy must be resolved within 4-24 
hours, and pharmacist reviews the patient’s 
home medication use and physician orders to 
detect and avoid errors. 
 Following interventions, rate of adverse drug 
events dropped by 91% and the hospital’s 
perceived safety culture improved. 
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McDiarmid & 
Condon (2005) 
Healthcare  Safety culture was found to help explain 
instances of non-compliance to hazardous 
drug guidelines. 
McDonald, 
Corrigan, Daly, 
& Cromie 
(2000) 
Aircraft Maintenance  Safety climate differs between organizations. 
 Safety climate differs across types of jobs 
(aircraft techs safety climate significantly 
lower than quality personnel/inspectors, 
planning personnel, and graduate 
engineers/management). 
 Types of consequences for errors differed 
significantly between organizations. 
McDonald, 
Waring, & 
Harrison 
(2006) 
Healthcare 
(n= 14 consultant-
grade surgeons, 12 
consultant 
anesthetists, and 13 
departmental 
mangers and 
administrators) 
 Physicians expressed that day-to-day work 
with patients could not easily be guided by 
pre-determined rules. 
 Physicians portrayed themselves as highly 
competent professionals, able to work without 
protocols or guidelines. 
 Many physicians viewed guidelines as a tool 
to help new staff because as specialized 
consultants they already had the necessary 
knowledge and experience. 
 Managers, however, were supportive of 
guidelines, rules and planning processes. 
 Managers believe they may be the ‘guardians’ 
of the system, but at the end of the day they 
have no control over what happens in the OR. 
 Like managers, physicians as times portray 
themselves as being placed in no-win 
situations by having to choose between 
unpalatable options. 
 Physicians accepted that risk is inevitable and 
they would make mistakes. 
 Mistakes were viewed as bad luck rather than 
inadequacies in individual performance or 
knowledge. 
 Concern that if physicians see mistakes as 
inevitable that they are less likely to report 
them if the purpose of reporting is to learn 
from mistakes. 
 There is a wide acceptance that there are 
many ways to conduct a surgery, indicating 
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that physicians are unlikely to criticize 
colleagues for ways that they do things. 
Mearns, et al. 
(1998) 
10 offshore oil 
installations (n= 722) 
 Employees who had not had an accident 
reported significantly more safety behaviors, 
job communication, and stronger attitudes 
towards work. 
 These employees were also happier with 
accident prevention and mitigation measures 
than the accident group. 
 However, there were no significant 
differences between accident prevention and 
non-accident groups for the work climate 
variables of work pressure or job security. 
 There were also no differences in attitudes to 
the onsite managers. 
 The accident group was more positive 
towards there own responsibility for safety. 
Mearns, Flin, 
Gordon, & 
Fleming (2001) 
Offshore oil and gas 
industry      (13 
installations; 722 
workers responded to 
surveys) 
 
 Results showed that the main predictor for 
accident and near-misses is ‘unsafe behavior’. 
 Perceived pressure for production was shown 
to be the driver of unsafe behaviors. 
 Satisfaction with safety measures was the best 
predictor of feelings of safety with regard to 
occupational hazards; workers appeared to not 
feel unsafe with regards to major hazards due 
to Offshore Safety Case legislation. 
Mearns, 
Rundmo, Flin, 
Gordon, & 
Fleming (2004) 
UK and Norwegian 
offshore oil 
installations 
 Significant differences found in workers’ 
perceptions of safety between UK and 
Norwegian sectors. 
 The installations themselves explained more 
variance than the sector did for all factors but 
‘safety attitudes’. 
Modak et al. 
(2007) 
Healthcare 
(ambulatory setting) 
 Physicians had least favorable attitudes about 
management, while management had the best 
attitudes. 
 Respondents had similar attitudes about 
teamwork climate, safety climate, job 
satisfaction and working conditions. 
Naveh, Katz-
Navon & Stern 
(2005; 2006) 
Healthcare (n= 3 
units; internal 
medicine, surgery, 
ICU) 
 Employees who perceive procedures as 
suitable and safety information as available 
are more likely to report treatment errors. 
 The three departments differed significantly 
on these factors. 
122 
 
Source Domain Key findings 
Neal & Griffin 
(2006) 
Healthcare  Results found that group safety climate 
increased individual safety motivation. This 
increase in turn boosted safety behavior, in 
the form of participation. 
 Group level changes in safety behaviors were 
related to a reduction in accidents. 
Neal, Griffin, 
& Hart (2000) 
Healthcare 
(n= 525 employees 
from 32 work groups 
at one hospital) 
 Organizational climate predicted safety 
climate. 
 Safety knowledge and motivation predicted 
safety compliance and participation. 
 The relationship between knowledge and 
compliance was stronger than the relationship 
between motivation and participation. 
 Safety climate influenced both knowledge and 
motivation. 
 Safety climate, knowledge and motivation 
mediated the relationship between 
organizational climate and safety 
performance. 
 If improvements in safety climate are to 
impact safety performance, must first change 
knowledge and employee motivation. 
Nielsen, 
Cartensen, & 
Rasmussen 
(2006) 
Industrial plants (n= 
2 plants) 
 Implemented a new incident reporting scheme 
at two industrial plants. 
 The intervention worked in only one of the 
plants which had a higher safety climate, 
higher management support and also a greater 
willingness to report incidents. 
Niskanen 
(1994a) 
Road maintenance, 
workers, and 
supervisors 
(n= 193) 
 Carelessness, being in a hurry, incorrect 
safety observations, and lack of safety 
knowledge were perceived to be important 
determinants of accidents. 
 Attitudes of supervisors and co-workers and 
manner of instruction were predictive of 
safety feedback. 
 Own actions, feedback, and safety judgments 
were significant predictors of safety 
knowledge and instructions. 
Niskanen 
(1994b) 
Road construction, 85 
workplaces (workers: 
n= 1890; supervisors: 
n= 562) 
 Supervisors and workers had slightly different 
factor structures. 
 Supervisors in low accident workplaces rate 
safety inspections better, rate their own 
importance higher, emphasize safety over 
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cost, and believe that accidents happen by 
chance less. 
 Workers in low accident workplaces value 
their own roles higher, suffer more mental 
stress, and report increased job responsibility 
than their counterparts in high accident 
workplaces. 
O’Toole (2002) Mining and 
construction 
(n= 1414 plant 
employees) 
 Most significant factor linked to the reduction 
of injury rates is change in upper 
management’s approach and emphasis on 
safety leadership and commitment to safety. 
 Appears to be a strong causal relationship 
with a reduction in injury rates. 
Ostrom et al. 
(1993) 
Nuclear energy 
laboratory (n= 4000 
administered across 5 
departments) 
 One department had a higher number of 
accidents than the others and was found to 
have more negative attitudes towards the 
availability and capability of safety personnel 
but statistical analyses were not conducted 
beyond descriptives. 
 Suggestions were made for further 
interpretation of the results but some tests 
(e.g., t-tests, chi square, correlations) were 
deemed too difficult to interrupt and would 
not be of additional use to management so 
were not conducted. 
Richter & 
Koch (2004) 
Manufacturing 
(n= 1 case study 
presented, but 
compared it to 2 
others) 
 Commonly understood that a chain of adverse 
events would lead to an accident. 
 Great deal of focus on economy and 
productivity. 
 Workers’ ability and qualifications to prevent 
production problems were valued greatly by 
themselves and management. 
 There were barriers (unspecified) embedded 
in the safety culture that limited the company 
from analyzing and coming up with effective 
safety measures. 
 Not possible to detect a unified safety culture. 
 Integration was a week element in safety 
culture; differentiation and ambiguity are 
much stronger. 
 When compared to other companies, 
variations in safety culture could be explained 
by differences in job content, social relations 
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and structures, combined with different 
impacts of macro-cultures. 
Rudman, 
Bailey, Garrett, 
Peden, 
Thomas, & 
Brown (2006) 
Healthcare (190 
providers from 8 
rural hospitals; ; 
Safety Attitudes 
Questionnaire 
(SAQ)) 
 Significant differences found between 
provider position on the teamwork 
collaboration factor—physicians were more 
positive in their attitudes towards teamwork 
than nurses; no differences found for other 
providers. 
 When compared to urban hospitals, mean 
scores were higher for rural hospitals. 
 Providers were satisfied with the quality of 
collaboration, felt suggestions concerning 
safety were acted upon by management, and 
felt that leadership was driving their hospitals 
to be safety centered. 
Rundmo 
(1994) 
8 offshore oil 
platforms from 5 oil 
companies (n= 915) 
 Management and employee commitment and 
involvement in safety work was the strongest 
predictor of satisfaction with safety measures. 
 Perceptions of safety vs. production goals and 
social support were also significant 
predictors. 
 Strong positive relationship between 
management commitment and involvement. 
Scalise (2005) Healthcare (n= 1400 
employees; survey 
validation) 
 Survey is easily understandable and related to 
safety. 
Sexton et al. 
(2006) 
Healthcare 
(n= 10,843 healthcare 
workers; SAQ 
validation study) 
 Six factors: teamwork climate, job 
satisfaction, perceptions of management, 
safety climate, working conditions and stress 
recognition. 
 SAQ is highly reliable (ρ= .90) and 
psychometrically sound. 
 SAQ differs from other safety climate surveys 
in four ways: (1) more widely used for a 
longer period of time, (2) more psychometric 
data is available, (3) maintains continuity with 
its predecessor (FMAQ), and (4) preserved 
item continuity with other high reliability 
industries allowing for comparisons between 
professionals and assists with search for 
universal HF issues across professions. 
Singer et al. 
(2003) 
Healthcare 
(n= 2989 healthcare 
 Overall problematic response to survey was 
18%. When adding in neutral responses, 
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workers) 36.5%. 
 Almost 52% believed that loss of experienced 
personnel negatively affected their ability to 
provide high quality care. 
 Many indicated a lack of rewards for 
identifying a serious mistake (33%) and fear 
of punishment for making a mistake (28%). 
39% witnessed a coworker do something 
unsafe. 8% admitted doing something unsafe 
for the patient in last year. 
 The average overall problematic response 
across all questions varied in individual 
hospitals from 13% to 22%. For individual 
questions, the range in problematic responses 
varied from 6% to 38% between institutions. 
 Clinicians, in general, were found to more 
likely provide problematic responses than 
non-clinicians. 
 Senior managers in general were less likely to 
give problematic responses than non-senior 
managers. 
 Clinician senior managers responded more 
similarly to clinicians than non-clinician 
senior managers (i.e., clinicians were more 
negative than non-clinicians regardless of 
management status). 
 Among clinicians, nurses were most negative 
and almost always responded more negatively 
than non-clinicians. 
 Overall, definite discrepancy between 
attitudes and experiences of senior managers 
Non-clinician senior managers answered 
more often in ways consistent with a culture 
of safety than did personnel who actually take 
care of patients. 
Smith, Cohen, 
Cohen, & 
Cleveland 
(1978) 
7 pairs of plants: 
wood and lumber 
products, metals, and 
manufacturing  
 
 Low accident plants had: 
 Higher management commitment to the safety 
program. 
 A more humanistic approach to dealing with 
employees. 
 Better communication between first-line and 
middle management. 
 Closer personal relationships between 
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Source Domain Key findings 
management and workforce. 
 Better hazard control. 
 There were no differences between low and 
high accident plants with regards to training, 
incident investigation, and policy statements. 
Thomas, 
Sexton, 
Neilands, 
Frankel, & 
Helmreich 
(2005) 
Healthcare 
(n= 1119 providers, 
baseline; n= 1000 
providers, post walk 
rounds) 
 After executive walk rounds (EWRs), mean 
safety climate scores and percent positive 
scores were not significantly different in 
control units and EWR units. 
 Nurses in control group had lower safety 
climate scores than nurses in EWR group. 
 5 items were hypothesized to be sensitive to 
EWRs. Of those 5, all were significantly 
different after the intervention in the EWR 
group but not the control group. 
 Nurses in the EWR group exhibited more 
favorable evaluations of safety climate 
through their responses to the individual 
safety climate items than control group nurses 
on 14 of 21 items. 
 Overall, EWR appear to have an impact on 
nurses’ perception of safety climate. 
Thompson et 
al. (1998) 
2 aviation 
manufacturing 
samples (1992: n= 
350; 1995: n= 329) 
 Managers and supervisors play but different 
roles in maintaining workplace safety. 
 Managers influence through politics of 
communication and have a direct impact on 
safety conditions. 
 Supervisors influenced safety compliance 
through fairness interaction. 
 Data collected in 1992 was used to construct a 
model which was confirmed with 1995 data 
from the same organization. 
Tomas et al. 
(1999) 
‘High-risk’ 
companies, 3 
workforce samples 
(1: n= 123; 2: n= 182; 
3: n= 124; total: n= 
429 
 Models for 2 and 3 samples showed 
acceptable fit to the data. 
 Safety climate was a direct predictor of 
supervisors’ response, and a weak non-
significant predictor of work behavior and co-
worker response. 
 Supervisors’ response was a central variable 
in the models, and linked climate with worker 
behavior. 
 In turn, behavior combined with assessment 
of hazards to influence perceptions of actual 
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Source Domain Key findings 
risk, the only variable in the model to be 
directly predictive of accidents. 
van Vuuren 
(2000) 
Steel industry  
(2 case studies 
examined) 
 Organizational failure contributed to incident 
causation 35 and 40% of the time. 
 Of this, safety culture contributed to incident 
causation 33 and 27% of the time. 
 Safety attitudes contributed to incident 
causation 67 and 85% of the time. 
 Risk management initiatives originated from a 
management level and affected entire 
organization. 
 Focus for improvement appeared to be on the 
process rather than the end product. 
Williamson, et 
al. (1997) 
7 manufacturing sites 
(n= 660, 42%) 
 
 A 5-factor structure using factor analysis was 
revealed and comprised of: motivation, 
positive safety practices, risk justification, 
fatalism, and optimism. 
 Workers who had experience accidents 
reported poorer safety practices, as well as 
less rationalization of the risks in the 
workplace. 
 Workers who perceived dangers in the 
workplace also tended to justify unsafe 
working conditions and be more optimistic 
regarding risks. 
 The results support the hypothesis that safety 
climate is a group-level construct. 
Yassi et al. 
(2005) 
Healthcare  Results suggest that a positive safety climate 
is one of the highest priority factors that 
contribute to lowering the risk of healthcare 
workers contracting SARS. 
Zacharatos, 
Barling, & 
Iverson (2005) 
Petroleum and 
telecommunications 
industries 
 Found that the 10 identified high-performance 
management practices are related to 
occupational safety. 
 Safety climate and trust in management were 
mediators of the relationship. 
Zohar (1980) Factories 
(5 from each field: 
metal fabrication, 
food processing, 
chemical industry, 
 Safety climate is a characteristic of industrial 
organizations. 
 Safety climate is related to general 
organizational safety level. 
 Management commitment and attitudes 
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textile industry) toward safety is major factor influencing 
success of safety programs. 
 Perceived relevance of safety to job behavior 
(i.e., importance of safety training and effects 
of work pace on safety) is also major factor 
influencing success of safety programs. 
 Other factors influencing safety climate: 
perceived status of safety committee (high vs. 
low rank); perceived status of safety officer; 
perceived effects of safe conduct on 
promotion; perceived level of risk at work 
place; and perceived effect of safe conduct on 
social status. 
Zohar (2000) Metal processing 
plant (n= 534 
production workers in 
53 work groups) 
 
 The results support the hypothesis that safety 
climate is a group-level construct. 
 Perceptions of supervisor safety practices 
varied between groups, but strong within 
group homogeneity was found. 
 Group perceptions of supervisor action and 
supervisor expectation were significant 
predictors of minor injuries within the subunit 
(post-questionnaire). 
 Lost-days accidents were negatively 
correlated with perceptions of supervisor 
expectations, but not with supervisor action. 
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INSTRUCTIONS: This survey asks for your opinions about patient safety issues, medical errors, and 
event reporting at Florida Hospital. Please answer all questions honestly by marking the appropriate box, 
circling a number, or filling in the blank. Any information you provide is voluntary and will be kept strictly 
confidential by researchers at UCF. Your responses will not be associated with your name in any way. The 
survey will take about 10 to 15 minutes to complete. 
 
• An “event” is defined as any type of error, mistake, incident, accident, or 
Deviation, regardless of whether or not it results in patient harm. 
• “Patient safety” is defined as the avoidance and prevention of patient injuries 
or adverse events resulting from the processes of health care delivery. 
 
Background and Experience Information  
 
1. At which Florida Hospital campus do you primarily work?
 Orlando 
 East Orlando 
 Celebration 
 Altamonte 
 Kissimmee 
 Winter Park 
 Apopka 
 Other, please specify: 
   
 
2. What is your primary work area or unit in this hospital? CHECK ONE.
 Many different 
hospital units/No 
specific unit 
 Medical Unit 
(non-surgical) 
 Operating Room 
 Cardiac Services 
 Emergency 
Department 
 CCU 
 CVICU 
 ICU 
 CV3 
 NCC 
 Behavioral Health 
 Rehabilitation 
 Laboratory 
 Surgical Unit 
 Respiratory 
 Radiology 
 Anesthesiology 
 Nutritional Services 
 Oncology 
 Pediatric, General Unit 
 Peds PCU/ICU 
 Neonatal ICU 
 Newborn  
 Environmental Services 
 Radiation Oncology 
 Pharmacy 
 Orthopedics 
 L & D 
 Post Partum 
 Material HR Unit 
 Ambulatory Care 
 Med/Surg Unit 
 Other, please specify: 
    
 
 
3. How long have you worked in your current hospital work area/unit? 
 Less than 1 year 
 1 to 5 years 
 6 to 10 years 
 11 to 15 years 
 16 to 20 years 
 21 years or 
more 
 
 
4. How many hours per shift do you typically work? 
 Less than 8 hours 
 9 or more hours but less than 12 hours 
 12 or more hours but less than 16 hours 
 16 or more hours
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5. What is your staff position in this hospital? Check ONE answer that BEST describes your staff position. 
 Registered Nurse 
 Physician Assistant/ Nurse Practitioner 
 LVN/LPN 
 Patient Care Assistant/Health Aide/ Sitter 
 Attending/Staff Physician 
 Resident Physician/Physician in Training  
 Pharmacist 
 Dietician 
 Unit assistant/Clerk Secretary 
 Respiratory Therapist 
 Physical, Occupational, or Speech Therapist 
 Technical (e.g., EKG, Lab, Imaging) 
 Administration/Management 
 Other, please specify:    
 
6. In your staff position, do you typically have direct interaction or contact with patients? Check ONE. 
 YES, I typically have direct interaction or contact with patients. 
 NO, I typically do NOT have direct interaction or contact with patients. 
 
 
7. How long have you worked in your current specialty or profession? 
 Less than 1 year 
 1 to 5 years 
 6 to 10 years 
 11 to 15 years 
 16 to 20 years 
 21 years or more 
 
 
SECTION A: Your Work Area/Unit 
In this survey, think of your “unit” as the work area, department, or clinical area of the hospital where you 
spend most of your work time or provide most of your clinical services. Please indicate your agreement or 
disagreement with the following statements about your work area/unit. Mark your answers by circling a number. 
           
        Strongly                  Strongly 
Think about your hospital work are/unit…  Disagree Disagree Neither   Agree Agree 
1. People support one another in this unit      1                2              3              4             5 
2. We have enough staff to handle the workload      1                2              3              4             5 
3. When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together 
 as a team to get the work done 
     1                2              3              4             5 
4. In this unit, people treat each other with respect      1                2              3              4             5 
5. Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for patient care      1                2              3              4             5 
6. We are actively doing things to improve patient safety      1                2              3              4             5 
7. We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care      1                2              3              4             5 
8. Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them      1                2              3              4             5 
9. Mistakes have led to positive changes here      1                2              3              4             5 
10. It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t happen around here      1                2              3              4             5 
11. When one area in this unit gets really busy others help out      1                2              3              4             5 
12. When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not 
the problem. 
     1                2              3              4             5 
13. After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate 
  their effectiveness 
     1                2              3              4             5 
14. We work in “crisis mode” trying to do too much, too quickly      1                2              3              4             5 
15. Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done      1                2              3              4             5 
16. Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file      1                2              3              4             5 
17. We have patient safety problems in this unit      1                2              3              4             5 
18. Our procedure and systems are good at preventing errors from happening      1                2              3              4             5 
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SECTION B: Your Supervisor/Manager 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about your immediate 
supervisor/manager or person to whom you directly report. Mark your answers by circling a number. 
 
Strongly                 Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Neither   Agree   Agree 
1. My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done 
according to established patient safety procedures 
  1                     2              3              4             5 
2. My supervisor/manager seriously considers safety suggestions for 
improving patient safety 
  1                     2              3              4             5 
3. Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work 
faster, even if it means taking shortcuts 
  1                     2              3              4             5 
4. My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen 
over and over 
  1                     2              3              4             5 
 
SECTION C: Communications 
How often do the following things happen in your work area/unit? Mark your answer by circling a number. 
            
             Most of 
Think about your hospital work area/unit…          Never  Rarely  Sometimes  the Time  Always  N/A 
1. We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event 
reports. 
1         2                 3                 4               5         0
2. Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect 
patient care. 
1         2                 3                 4               5         0
3. We are informed about errors that happen in this unit. 1         2                 3                 4               5         0
4. Staff feels free to question the decisions or actions of those with more 
authority. 
1         2                 3                 4               5         0
5. In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again. 1         2                 3                 4               5         0
6. Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right 1         2                 3                 4               5         0
 
 
SECTION D: Frequency of Events Reported 
In your hospital work are/unit, when the following mistakes happen, how often are they reported? Mark your 
answer by circling a number.                                  
             Most of 
               Never  Rarely  Sometimes  the Time  Always  N/A 
1. When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before 
affecting the patient, how often is this reported? 
1         2                 3                 4               5         0
2. When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, 
how often is this reported? 
1         2                 3                 4               5         0
3. When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, 
how often is this reported? 
1         2                 3                 4               5         0
 
SECTION E: Patient Safety Grade 
Please give your work area/unit in this hospital an overall grade on patient safety. Mark ONE answer. 
 
Ο A Excellent 
Ο B Very Good 
Ο C Acceptable 
Ο D Poor 
Ο E Failing 
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SECTION F: Your Hospital 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about your hospital. Mark your 
answer by circling a number. 
                                                      Strongly                                         Strongly 
Think about your hospital…                  Disagree Disagree  Neither  Agree  Agree 
1. Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient 
safety 
      1               2                3           4           5 
2. Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other       1               2                3           4           5 
3. Things “fall between the cracks” when transforming patients from one 
unit to another 
      1               2                3           4           5 
4. There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work 
together. 
      1               2                3           4           5 
5. Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes       1               2                3           4           5 
6. It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units       1               2                3           4           5 
7. Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units       1               2                3           4           5 
8. The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top 
priority.  
      1               2                3           4           5 
9. Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an 
adverse event happens 
      1               2                3           4           5 
10. Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients       1               2                3           4           5 
11. Shift changes are problematic for patients in this hospital       1               2                3           4           5 
 
SECTION G: Number of Events Reported 
In the past 12 months, how many event reports have you filled out and submitted? Mark ONE answer. 
 
 
 
Ο No event reports  
Ο 1 to 2 event reports 
Ο 3 to 5 event reports 
Ο 6 to 10 event reports 
Ο 11 to 20 event reports 
Ο 21 event reports or more 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please feel free to write any comment about patient safety, errors, or event reporting in your hospital. 
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